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In 1940, then United States Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
stated, "The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputa-
tion than any other person in America."' "It's local prosecutors, not
judges or governors, who most often decide which criminals live or die
for their crimes," Tina Rosenberg flatly postulated in her New York
Times Magazine article entitled Deadliest D.A.2 Both statements are
entirely accurate. Capital punishment has appropriately been the subject
of many law review articles and books. The gravity and finality of the
penalty stir strong feelings on both sides of the issue. The various
aspects of capital punishment include the potential execution of the
innocent, the roles of politics, race and poverty, deterrence, cost, moral
and religious perceptions, and a host of other issues.
I write this Article from the perspective of a lawyer in his twenty-
eighth year as District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, having
served almost four years prior as an assistant district attorney. I write
from the perspective of one who has tried or supervised, directly or
indirectly, many hundreds of homicide prosecutions. My genuine respect
for the district attorneys of Wisconsin and for the hundreds of other
prosecutors with whom I have worked or been professionally associated
in the National District Attorneys' Association and the American Bar
Association is immense. Some of those prosecutors support capital
punishment and some oppose it.
My various experiences and contacts through the years have played
a role in shaping my opposition to capital punishment. It is from this
particular perspective, that of the experienced elected district attorney,
that I write at this time as the Wisconsin legislature deliberates the
* District Attorney, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; B.A., University of Detroit, 1959,
LL.B., Georgetown University, 1962, LL.M., Harvard University, 1963. Mr. McCann was first
elected District Attorney in 1968 and has been re-elected to the post every two years
thereafter. In perhaps his most prominent case, Mr. McCann successfully prosecuted serial
slayer Jeffrey Dahmer in 1992.
1. JOHN J. DOUGLASS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 9 (1988).
2. Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 16, 1995, at 21.
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adoption of capital punishment. My focus will be upon potential
execution of the innocent, on politics and race, and more briefly on cost
and deterrence. I will touch, as well, on the opposition to capital
punishment among Wisconsin district attorneys and from religious
consistories in the State.
PROPOSED WISCONSIN LEGISLATION
Four bills, SB 1,' AB 298, 4 AB 352,5 and AB 9376 are pending
before the legislature proposing various grounds for the adoption of
capital punishment in the State of Wisconsin. All the bills would apply
to offenders sixteen years of age or older who intentionally kill.7 SB 1
would provide capital punishment for the slaying of a child under
sixteen.' AB 352 would expand the victim category to include an on-
duty police officer or correctional officer.9 AB 298 would apply to the
killing (1) of a victim for hire, (2) of a child under age fourteen, (3) of
an on-duty firefighter, peace officer, or corrections employee, (4) of
serial or multiple victims, and (5) in connection with a kidnapping or
sexual assault.' AB 937 would provide capital punishment for any
intentional killing.1 Each bill provides for trial to a court or jury in a
bifurcated procedure with ascertainment of guilt in the first portion and
determination of punishment in the second. Under the bills, the jury will
be instructed to consider the presence or absence of several aggravating
factors and several mitigating factors listed in the bills and other
mitigating factors submitted by the defense.12
Under SB 1, AB 298, and AB 352, the sentence recommended by the
majority jury will be advisory to the trial judge who is then to weigh the
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and impose capital
punishment or a life sentence with various or no release options. 3
Under AB 937, the majority jury recommendation will be for life
3. S.B. 1, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1995) [hereinafter SB 1].
4. A.B. 298, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1995) [hereinafter AB 298].
5. A.B. 352, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1995) [hereinafter AB 352].
6. A.B. 937, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1996) [hereinafter AB 937].
7. SB 1, supra note 3, § 27; AB 298, supra note 4, § 27; AB 352, supra note 5, § 27; AB
937, supra note 6, § 26.
8. SB 1, supra note 3, § 25.
9. AB 352, supra note 5, § 25.
10. AB 298, supra note 4, § 25.
11. AB 937, supra note 6, § 24.
12. SB 1, supra note 3, § 36; AB 298, supra note 4, § 36; AB 352, supra note 5, § 36; AB
937, supra note 6, § 35.
13. SB 1, supra note 3, § 36; AB 298, supra note 4, § 36; AB 352, supra note 5, § 36.
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imprisonment or death and the judge, after weighing the factors, shall
make the final decision. 4 Under all four bills, if death is imposed,
appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be automatic.15 Under SB
1, AB 298, and AB 352, Wisconsin Statutes section 940.01(1)'6 would
remain as it is, broadly crafted to include all intentional homicide, while
the proposals would add options available to be targeted at the offenders
involved in the types of intentional homicides listed under what would
become 940.01(1)(b) 1 7 AB 937 would replace current section 940.01(1),
and would provide either life without parole or execution upon
conviction.IS
Current reports indicate that a capital punishment bill would pass in
the assembly but would fall one vote short in the Senate.19 On March
28, 1996, a resolution to place a referendum question on capital
punishment on the November 1996 ballot failed in the Wisconsin Senate
by a vote of twenty-one to twelve.2" A number of supporters of capital
punishment voted against the proposal on grounds other than opposition
to executions. 21 While it appears unlikely that the current legislature
will adopt any of the pending bills, all persons knowledgeable on the
issue, aware of the extensive support for capital punishment among
legislators, anticipate a strong return to the subject in the 1997-1999
session. A capital punishment bill in the 1993-94 session fell substantially
short, twenty-one to twelve, of adoption in the Senate.22 It appears
likely that the recent bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
14. AB 937, supra note 6, § 35.
15. SB 1, supra note 3, § 36; AB 298, supra note 4, § 36; AB 352, supra note 5, § 36; AB
937, supra note 6, § 35.
16. The present version of the statute reads: "OFFENSE. Except as provided in sub. (2),
whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another
is guilty of a Class A felony." Wis. STAT. § 940.01(1) (1995). Subsection (1) would be
renumbered to (1)(a) under three bills: SB 1, supra note 3, § 24; AB 298, supra note 4, § 24;
AB 352, supra note 5, § 24.
17. SB 1, supra note 3, §§ 24 and 25; AB 298, supra note 4, §§ 24 and 25; AB 352, supra
note 5, §§ 24 and 25.
18. AB 937, supra note 6, § 24.
19. Richard P. Jones, State Senate May Set Death Penalty Referendum, MILWAUKEE J.
& SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 1996, at 1; Amy Rinard. Fall Capitol Session May be 'Way Ugly',
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1995, at B5.
20. Steven Walters, Death Penalty Referendum Killed; Senate Shelves Proposal to Hold
an Advisory Vote in November, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 1996, at 1.
21. The Author believes that the vote reflects the Senate's sentiment on the referendum
only, and not its sentiment on the death penalty itself, as evidenced by the fact that several
pro-death penalty senators voted against the referendum.
22. JOURNAL OF THE WIS. SENATE, Oct. 19, 1993, at 480. The vote on Senate Bill 23 was
21 to 12 in favor of indefinite postponement. Id.
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in Oklahoma City,' the continuing impact of Jeffrey Dahmer's necro-
philic serial slayings, and several other widely publicized murders in
Wisconsin have quickened citizen and legislative support for capital
punishment.24 Paroled sex offender David Spanbauer was convicted of
the Fox River Valley intentional homicides of ten-year-old Ronelle
Eichstedt, twelve-year-old Cora Jones, and twenty-one-year-old Trudi
Jeschke. James and Theodore Oswald, father and son respectively, were
convicted of the intentional slaying of on-duty Waukesha Police Captain
James A. Lutz during a wild west style bank robbery, hostage seizure,
and gun firing chase. Curtis Walker and Denziss Jackson were convicted
of the intentional ambush killing of on-duty Milwaukee Police Officer
William Robertson. All the Wisconsin offenders involved were
sentenced to lengthy terms that will surely result in their deaths in prison
except for the eighteen-year-old Jackson who was sentenced to fifty years
without parole for his somewhat lesser role in Officer Robertson's death.
These types of slayings leave distraught family members and
communities deeply touched and troubled by the loss of children and
respected peace officers. Polls show that a majority of Wisconsin citizens
(71%) now support the adoption of a capital punishment law.' When
given the choice, however, between death and life in prison with no
opportunity for parole, the percentage in favor of death drops to 53%.26
Even if the victim were a twelve-year-old child, the percentage in favor
of death over life without parole increases to no more than 65%.27
It is understandable that consideration of capital punishment for the
offender would arise in connection with murder cases. Clearly, the
offender has torn from the victim a value beyond all property: life itself.
No amount of restitution can make the victim whole. Anguish beyond
compare is visited upon the family of the victim. A child loses a parent,
a parent loses a child, a spouse or sibling's life is taken and the lives of
the survivors are materially changed for all their own lifetimes. When
the loss of life is attended with the knowledge that the loved victim was
23. Oklahoma is a capital punishment state. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21, § 701.9 (west
1996).
24. See, e.g., Richard P. Jones, Death Penalty Passage Predicted, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Apr. 21, 1995, at B5.
25. James Rowen, Death Penalty Faces Its Moment of Truth, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al. The article states that "a poll taken by St. Norbert's Survey
Center and Wisconsin Public Radio in early April [1995] showed 71% statewide backing for
state-sponsored executions." Id.
26. Wisconsin Public Radio-St. Norbert College Survey Center, The Wisconsin Survey
Fall 1993, Nov. 9, 1993, at 3.
27. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 79:649
OPPOSING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
first sexually assaulted, wounded, or tortured, the feelings of deprivation,
anger, and anguish often impact upon the survivors with an overwhelm-
ing force beyond any other experience known to the human spirit. It
comes as no wonder that in the United States, where in excess of 20,000
have been slain annually in the recent past, 8 the demand for capital
punishment has grown. If the keenly felt desire for vengeance alone
could guarantee sound public policy, capital punishment would carry the
day. However, to oppose the adoption of capital punishment is not to
fail to appreciate the value of human life. Indeed, it is the very
importance and preciousness beyond compare of human life that
underpins the most powerful reason to oppose capital punishment-the
knowledge that innocent persons will inevitably be convicted and
executed.
ExEcUTION OF THE INNOCENT
Mr. Justice Marshall, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,29 noted that
"[n]o matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony,
mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too real. We
have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been executed,
but we can be certain that there were some. 30
In Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken
Execution, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights listed
forty-eight capital punishment cases arising between 1973 and 1993 in
which convictions were overturned and persons released from death
row.3 I The Subcommittee study in part concluded:
Americans are justifiably concerned about the possibility that an
innocent person may be executed. Capital punishment in the
United States today provides no reliable safeguards against this
danger. Errors can and have been made repeatedly in the trial
of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial
prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of
erroneous evidence. Once convicted, a death row inmate faces
28. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1994, at 58, 60 (1995) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES].
29. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
30. Id. at 367-68 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
31. STAFF REPORT BY THE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:




serious obstacles in convincing any tribunal that he is innocent.32
The Subcommittee study reflected a continuation of the work of
Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet. Bedau and
Radelet conducted an extensive investigation of capital cases reported in
various fashions to be potential miscarriages of justice.33 They identi-
fied 350 cases of capital punishment convictions between 1900 and 1985
in which there are sound reasons to conclude that the convictions were
in error.34 In 139 of those cases, the defendant was sentenced to die.35
In 23 cases, the innocent defendant was executed.36 They listed the
grounds for such errors as follows with more than one error having
occurred in some cases:
CAUSES OF ERRONEOUS CONVICTION 37
Type of Error* Ni
I. POLICE ERROR
A. Coerced or other false confession
B. Negligence
C. Other overzealous police work
II. PROSECUTOR ERROR
A. Suppression of exculpatory evidence
B. Other overzealous prosecution
III. WITNESS ERROR
A. Mistaken eyewitness identification
B. Perjury by prosecution witness
C. Unreliable or erroneous prosecution
testimony
IV. OTHER ERROR
A. Misleading circumstantial evidence
B. Incompetence of defense counsel
C. Judicial denial of admissibility of
exculpatory evidence





32. Id. at 19.
33. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). The research that culminated in that article has been
updated. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET. AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992).
34. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 33, at 23-24, 91-172, and passim.
35. Id. at 36 (Table 2).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 57 (excerpting Table 6).
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E. Erroneous judgment on cause of death 16
F. Fraudulent alibi or false guilty plea made
by defendant 17
G. Conviction demanded by community
outrage 70
H. Unknown 14
Number of cases counted once: 198 (including all "unknown" cases)
Number of cases counted twice: 120
Number of cases counted three times: 32
In their article, Bedau and Radelet discuss each of the 350 cases
identifying the circumstances of the prosecution and the critical elements
that caused the erroneous conviction. 8 The scenarios presented
occurred in many different states and could recur in any state.
The Bedau and Radelet study included five Wisconsin cases in which
murder convictions were returned by the jury, and the verdicts were later
overturned:
Johnson, John (white). 1911. Wisconsin. John Johnson was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. A
former mental patient, Johnson feared being lynched. When told
that a mob was about to break into his cell, he confessed. A
former judge, however, was convinced of Johnson's innocence and
continued to pursue the case. Governor Blaine commuted
Johnson's sentence, and in 1922 Johnson was released after the
victim's father was shown to have committed the crime.
31
Long, Eli J. (white). 1918. Wisconsin. Long was convicted
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1920, he was
released by court action on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. Efforts to obtain compensation from the state failed.'
LeFevre, Frank B. (white). 1942. Wisconsin. LeFevre was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Alibi testimony and results of lie detector tests (not
admitted at trial) supported his claim of innocence. On appeal,
the conviction was reversed on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction, and LeFevre's release was
ordered.41
38. Id. at 91-172 (Appendix A).
39. Id. at 131.
40. Id. at 141; Long v. State, 176 Wis. 361, 187 N.W. 167 (1922).




Kanieski, Edward F. (white). 1952. Wisconsin. Kanieski was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Kanieski consistently maintained his innocence, but his
petitions for a writ of error and habeas corpus were denied.42
In 1972, on further appeal, the conviction was reversed, and the
state supreme court ordered Kanieski released after he had
served nearly twenty years.43 The court found the evidence was
not sufficient to sustain the conviction and directed that Kanieski
"is thus entitled to release from custody and his freedom, without
the possibility of a new trial."'"
Reichhoff, Kenny Ray (white). 1975. Wisconsin. Reichhoff
was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment. In 1977, an investigation by Wisconsin State
Journal reporter Richard Jaeger raised many doubts and revealed
major discrepancies in the prosecutor's case. On appeal the
conviction was overturned on the technical grounds that the judge
erred in allowing the jury to infer that the defendant's silence at
the time of his arrest was a tacit admission of guilt.45 Later in
1977, Reichhoff was acquitted at retrial; after nearly three years
in prison he was released.46
Three additional cases from Milwaukee County also highlight how
errors can occur:
State v. Fillyaw47 relied on circumstantial evidence for the conviction
and life sentence of a black defendant for the 1977 slaying of his
girlfriend. An appeal based on legal issues was unsuccessful. Later
retesting of the defendant's blood raised a question as to the accuracy of
a state crime laboratory serologist's trial testimony, possibly occasioned
by malfunctioning testing equipment, which matched the defendant's
blood to a blood stain on the victim's purse. The court determined that
the new test raised such doubt as to merit vacation of the conviction
under which the defendant had served ten years. As the blood stain on
the purse had been completely consumed in the original testing, none
was available for retesting for a new trial and the defendant was
42. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 33, at 133 (citing Kanieski v. Gagnon, 427 F.2d 401 (7th
Cir. 1970)); State v. Kanieski, 30 Wis. 2d 573, 141 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
43. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 33, at 133 (citing Kanieski v. Gagnon, 54 Wis. 2d 108,
194 N.W.2d 808 (1972)).
44. Id. (quoting Kanieski, 54 Wis. 2d at 117, 194 N.W.2d at 813).
45. Id. at 153 (citing Reichoff v. State,76 Wis. 2d 375, 251 N.W.2d 470 (1977)).
46. Id.




Another instructive case, State v. Hemauer,49 did not relate to
murder but to counts of attempted murder and sexual assault; the case
involved strong eyewitness testimony by the victim and other circumstan-
tial inculpatory evidence. The proffered alibi of an acquaintance of the
white defendant persuaded neither the District Attorney's Office nor the
jury, and the defendant was convicted of abduction, rape, and attempted
murder.50 He served eight years in prison before newly available
scientific testing of seminal deposits on the victim's underwear excluded
the defendant as her assailant.5
In State v. Sanders,52 the defendant was charged with the 1973
slayings of on-duty Milwaukee Police Officers Gerald Hempe and
Charles Smith. 3 There was good reason to believe that several friends
of the accused saw the killings, but full, continuing cooperation was not
forthcoming.' A young parolee came forward, however, who had
particular knowledge regarding the shooting: (1) he was able to describe
the shooting, (2) he related details such as where the police van stood
and where the officers bodies lay, and (3) he described the conduct of
police on the scene during the investigation. The fact that the parolee
had sought no parole advantage as confirmed by police and his agent,
that he did not seem to stand to benefit from his cooperation, that he
seemed sincere, and that his details concerning (2) and (3) above were
accurate, all led police officers and the district attorney to believe he was
truthful about seeing the shooting of the officers. On motion of the
defendant because of pretrial publicity, the case was transferred to Green
Bay in Brown County.5 The parolee testified forcefully in court
concerning the slayings, identifying the defendant as the shooter. Cross-
examination, hailed by Wigmore as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,"56 was conducted by
skilled and experienced defense counsel but did not shake the parolee.
48. The decision releasing Fillyaw from custody was signed on Mar. 3, 1987. The case,
No. 1-9490, is on file with the Milwaukee County District Attorney.
49. 64 Wis. 2d 62, 218 N.W.2d 342 (1974).
50. Id. at 64, 218 N.W.2d at 343.
51. The decision releasing Hemauer from custody was signed on Apr. 8, 1981. The case,
No. H-4499, is on file with the Milwaukee County district attorney.
52. 69 Wis. 2d 242, 230 N.W.2d 845 (1975).
53. Id. at 244-45, 230 N.W.2d at 848.
54. Id. at 252-55, 230 N.W.2d at 851-53.
55. Id. at 260-61, 230 N.W.2d at 855-56.




The testimony of the parolee was broadcast on television in Milwaukee,
and a young man immediately contacted authorities and stated that he
had been with the parolee a few blocks from the shooting and that the
parolee had been drawn to the homicide locus by the sirens of respond-
ing squads, and arrived there to observe the scene and the conduct of
investigators moments after the shooting. The parolee continued to
insist he was telling the truth, recanting only as he was being hooked up
to a polygraph machine. The prosecution offered to join in a mistrial
motion, but the defense declined, strategically anticipating benefit from
the prosecutor's statement to the jury at its next session that the parolee
had given false testimony." While the defendant was properly found
guilty by the jury of both murder counts, the case illustrates that even
good faith conduct of police and prosecutor can still fail on occasion to
identify false testimony and that cross-examination cannot always insure
that a perjurious witness will be unmasked.
Murder at the hands of a wrongdoer is tragic. Intentional execution
of an innocent person at the hands of the government, after the disgrace
attendant upon wrongful adjudication of guilt, no matter how the error
occurred, is, simply put, horrendous. Because we do not tolerate
murder, faulty executions by the government must be stopped as well.
Can such official erroneous executions be prevented short of ending
capital punishment?
THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
Virtually all cases resulting in a murder conviction, well founded or
not, were initiated by a prosecuting attorney acting within the broad
discretion traditionally accorded district attorneys in all states. In most
cases, it is the prosecutor who decides whether to seek the death penalty
or not. In view of the key role that district attorneys clearly play in all
capital punishment cases, especially those in which error begets
conviction and execution of the innocent occur, we must ask what
measures can be taken with respect to the prosecution function to flatly
ensure that such miscarriages of justice do not occur.
A number of carefully crafted precepts have been advanced by the
American Bar Association (ABA), the National District Attorneys
Association (NDAA), and the American Bar Association Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Committee whose Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct have correlates in most states, that are designed in part to
57. Sanders, 69 Wis. 2d at 264, 230 N.W.2d at 857.
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reduce the possibility that prosecutors will convict the innocent.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and
Defense Function, section 3-3.9, provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the
prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted,
or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the
absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support the convic-
tion.
(b) ... Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may
properly consider in exercising his or her discretion are:
(1) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty[.]5s
Similar standards are found in the NDAA National Prosecution
Standards.9 Tracking the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
58. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter PROSECUTION FUNCTION].
59. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (2d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. Under "Screening," section 42.3
provides:
Factors to Consider
The prosecutor should exercise discretion in screening for the purpose of eliminating
matters from the criminal justice system in which prosecution is not justified or not
in the public interest. Factors which may be considered in this decision include:
a. Doubt as to the accused's guilt;
b. Insufficiency of admissible evidence to support a conviction;
c. Reluctance of a victim to cooperate in the prosecution;
d. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
e. The availability of adequate civil remedies;
f. The availability of suitable diversion and rehabilitative programs;
g. Provisions for restitution;
h. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority;
i. Aid to other prosecution goals through non-prosecution;
j. The age of the case;
k. The attitude and mental status of the accused;
1. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
m. A history of non-enforcement of the applicable violation;
n. Failure of law enforcement agencies to perform necessary duties or
investigation;
o. The expressed desire of an accused to release potential civil claims against
victims, witnesses, law enforcement agencies and their personnel, and the
prosecutor and his personnel, where such desire is expressed after the
opportunity to obtain advice from counsel and is knowing and voluntary;
p. Any mitigating circumstances.
Id. § 42.3.
Under the heading "Charging," section 43.6 provides:
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:649
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule (S.C.R.) 20:3.8 provides that "[t]he
prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause[.] 6°
Essentially, these guidelines and rules provide that a district attorney
may charge a homicide case on probable cause grounds and ought not
proceed to trial without substantially stronger evidence. However, the
far better charging practice, and one which emphasizes justice and
substantially reduces the possibility of charging and convicting an
innocent person, is "but for the exceptional case, not to invoke the
awesome power of the state unless the crime in all likelihood can be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
' 61
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution Function and
Defense Function, section 3-3.11, targeting the problem of concealed
exculpatory evidence, provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely
disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of
the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate
Factors to Consider.
The prosecutor should exercise his discretion to file only those charges which he
considers to be consistent with the interests of justice. Factors which may be
considered in this decision include:
a. The probability of conviction;
b. The nature of the offense;
c. The characteristics of the offender;
d. Possible deterrent value of prosecution to the offender and society in
general;
e. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority;
f. The willingness of the offender to cooperate with law enforcement;
g. Aid to other criminal justice goals through non-prosecution;
h. The interests of the victim;
i. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
j. The availability of adequate civil remedies;
k. The age of the offense;
1. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
m. A history of non-enforcement of a statute;
n. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the offense;
o. Recommendations of the involved law enforcement agency;
p. The expressed desire of an offender to release potential civil claims against
victims, witnesses, law enforcement agencies and their personnel, and the
prosecutor and his personnel, where such desire is expressed after the
opportunity to obtain advice from counsel and is knowing and voluntary; and
q. Any mitigating circumstances.
Id. § 43.6.
60. Wis. S.C.R. 20:3.8.
61. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 368, 441 N.W.2d 696, 702 (1989)
(Heffernan, C.J., concurring).
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the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of
evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecu-
tion's case or aid the accused.62
The NDAA National Prosecution Standards and the Wisconsin counter-
parts to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose similar
requirements on district attorneys.63 Numerous cases spell out and
elaborate this duty of the prosecution.'
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution Function and
Defense Function targets perjured and erroneous evidence, providing that
"[a] prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by
documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to
seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity."'6 Following the
ABA Model Code, Wisconsin S.C.R. 20:3.3(a)(4) provides a similar
ethical stricture relating to evidence known to be false.6 6 Under
Mooney v. Holohan, knowing use of false testimony and evidence by a
prosecutor violates constitutional due process and constitutes reversible
error.67 Wisconsin S.C.R. 20:3.3(c) provides that "[a] lawyer may refuse
to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false." 68 The
rules ought to provide that no prosecutor should ever present evidence
he or she reasonably believes is false.
In a nutshell, the relevant standards, ethical rules, and cases provide
that a prosecutor ought not proceed with a case without solid evidence
of guilt, ought never use false testimony or evidence, and should
promptly provide all information and material to the defense which tends
to exculpate the offender or mitigate the penalty. The rules are well
known to prosecutors. Tragically, they are occasionally violated in
capital cases in which a conviction can cost an innocent person, or one
62. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 58, at § 3-3.11.
63. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 59, at §§ 25.4,52.2, 53.1-.5; Wis. S.C.R.
20:3-4(d), 20:3.8(d).
64. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
State v. Gibas, 184 Wis. 2d 355, 516 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d
177, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984): Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).
65. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 58, at § 3-5.6(a).
66. WiS. S.C.R. 20:3.3(a)(4).
67. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
68. Wis. S.C.R. 20:3.3(c) (emphasis added).
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in truth guilty of a lesser charge, his or her very life. Even in the
absence of a violation of such rules, how is it that an innocent person can
be charged and convicted by a district attorney? Why are the rules
sometimes violated and why must one fear, or indeed even anticipate,
that they will be violated in Wisconsin in capital cases?
Consider first the possibility of good faith error by the district
attorney in charging a case. Prosecutors are drawn from the public at
large, and the available pool of attorneys in particular. Inevitably there
will be variances from one district attorney to another in the skills,
experience, and acumen available to understand the facts, organize the
materials, and assess whether appropriate evidence exists to charge and
convict. In less populated counties in Wisconsin, even with salary
increases over the past five years, the pay is sometimes not sufficient to
attract or long retain the most capable lawyers.69 Differences in
experience at evaluating the authenticity and accuracy of witnesses can
be vital. Conscientious witnesses can make erroneous identifications.
The young, inexperienced prosecutor, not having confronted erroneous
or biased or perjurious witnesses, is more likely to accept their credibility
than the more seasoned, veteran district attorney who has encountered
many such persons over years of practice. Some slayings, particularly
gang murders, are prosecutable only through the testimony of criminally
involved co-conspirators. In other cases, informers involved in perfidious
relationships will covertly offer information. Sometimes a cellmate of an
offender will claim the accused has made damaging admissions. In many
69. The salary of the elected district attorney is determined by the state legislature.
Each district attorney is compensated according to his or her category, determined by the
population of the "prosecutorial unit" in which he or she serves. Wis. STAT. § 978.12(1)(a)
(1993-94).
The Joint Committee on Employment Relations (JCOER) approved the following salaries
for district attorneys on June 27, 1995:
Population Category 1995-96 DA Term 1997-98 DA Term
> 500,000 $ 92,442 $ 95,236
> 250,000 to 500,000 83,328 85,850
> 100,000 to 250,000 78,772 81,156
> 75,000 to 100,000 74,214 76,458
> 50,000 to 75,000 69,658 71,765
> 35,000 to 50,000 65,100 67,069
> 20,000 to 35,000 60,544 62,375
< 20,000 55,988 57,683
State Prosecutor's Office Memorandum (SPO) 95-44, June 20, 1995, and updated to reflect the
approval of the JCOER on Feb. 29, 1996.
Assistant district attorneys (ADAs) salaries for the 1995-97 term are set at a minimum
of $17.762 per hour ($36,944.96 per year), $18.296 per hour ($38,053.60) after a six-month
raise, to a maximum of $44.592 per hour ($92,751.36). SPO 95-44, at 2.
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such cases, the potential witness has a substantial criminal record and is
seeking some benefit from the system, often the reduction or dismissal
of a charge pending against him or her.
It falls to the district attorney to consider all witnesses, whether they
appear honorable or dishonorable, to determine what opportunity and
capability they had to see or hear the facts alleged, to discern motives or
biases, to confront them aggressively or disarm them with graciousness,
to examine (and in effect cross-examine) them, always probing for the
truth or falsity of their statements, and to cause as careful a check as
possible for corroboration or conflict with the known facts. Some district
attorneys may not have the energy, time, know-how, will, skill, or the
patience to so scrutinize witnesses. Some prosecutors may simply work
off police reports and undertake no independent assessment of witness
reliability. Clearly the impact of the prosecutor and the manner in which
he or she assesses and handles the witnesses in a homicide case can
result in an effective prosecution of the guilty or a tragic persecution of
the innocent. Indeed, some Wisconsin prosecutors, acting in good faith
but lacking experience, skill or dedication, have obtained convictions of
innocent persons. 70 However, even extensive experience, superb skills,
and intense dedication are no guarantee against a miscarriage of
justice.71 It is inevitable that other innocent persons will also be
convicted. Execution, of course, ends all potential for undoing such
errors.
Because many offenders do not kill in the presence of others,
homicide prosecutions are frequently based on circumstantial evidence.
The competence or incompetence of crime laboratory work and whether
there has been effective collection of both potentially inculpatory and
exculpatory information is critical. Some police officers involved in
murder investigations are indefatigable in their efforts to lawfully secure
every relevant physical item, to carefully record where it was found or
received, to appropriately handle, mark, and package it, and forward it
as may be proper for expert evaluation. Other officers negligently miss
both inculpatory and exculpatory items, inadequately record their receipt
of evidence, fail to mark or package it properly, casually retain it unduly
long in personal custody rather than promptly inventory it, and
sometimes do not forward items that should be sent to a crime laborato-
ry. In less populous jurisdictions, an experienced district attorney may
70. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
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work directly in the field with officers insuring better preparation of
cases, but running the risk of getting so caught up in the pursuit as to
lose appropriate distance for assessment. An inexperienced prosecutor
attempting to direct the field investigation raises the likelihood of
impairing a case rather than enhancing it. In large jurisdictions with
specialized homicide investigation units, quality of work can vary from
excellent to deficient, depending upon the team of detectives. In
circumstantial evidence cases, a lack of quality in physical evidence
collection and crime laboratory analysis can result not only in the guilty
escaping punishment but in the innocent being convicted.
During several years of experience, a district attorney will work
closely with many law enforcement officers, talk informally with them,
and learn of their biases or prejudices, as well as of their rectitude. He
or she will observe their testimony, and that of their witnesses, in the
great mine run of cases, especially those involving resistance to arrest.
The prosecutor may see the officers interrogate prisoners and hear their
testimony, as well as that of the interrogated prisoners, during motions
to suppress confessions. This experience can materially aid the
conscientious prosecutor in a hard-nosed assessment as to whether police
overreaching was involved in securing a confession and how much
reliance should be placed on inculpatory statements reported but
challenged by the accused. However, while long-term working relation-
ships with officers can provide significant information as to their
credibility or suspected mendacity, such contacts can also give rise to
friendships that may impair the prosecutor's capacity for critical
assessment of claims of police overreaching in securing confessions.
The terrible menace of such a confession containing unfounded
admissions by a person of marginal intelligence, whose will is easily
overborne, secured by excessively zealous or overreaching officers, about
whose credibility the prosecutor feels visceral suspicions (the so-called
"gut" test), is that it may lead directly to the conviction of an innocent
person. A key concern, in the case of jury trials, is not that the officers
would fabricate the confessions but that their testimony about the
manner in which the confessions were secured would lack the candor
critical to the jurors' determination as to how trustworthy the confessions
are. The confession of a retarded person, particularly when that person
was in spatial propinquity to the locus of the offense at the critical time
and there is a dearth of corroborating or conflicting evidence, must be
scrutinized with great care, even when taken by an upright officer, to
reject unfounded admissions of wrongdoing yielded from the highly
suggestible, limited intellect of the accused. Any prosecutor worth his
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or her salt, confronted with such confessions must employ all the
experience, skill, and discernment at his or her command to determine
the reliability of each respective confession and thereupon to use or not
use the confession. On occasion, either in response to the district
attorney's question or by a volunteered comment, an officer or
commander of integrity will tell the district attorney that he or she has
doubts about the veracity of a confession. In the end, there can be no
guarantee that the district attorney's decision is right and, if wrong, an
innocent person might be convicted of a murder. Unfortunately, some
prosecutors may not even sense the tenuous aspects of such confessions
or because of friendship with the officers may take all such confessions
at face value. Other prosecutors, being of unconscionably timorous bent,
may be unwilling to confront police hostility occasionally triggered by a
decision not to use a confession with the adverse implications that such
a determination has for a conviction.
Experience as a prosecutor working with various officers can help
distinguish between, on one hand, the hard-working officer who secures
in an unbiased fashion all the information a witness may have and
conducts lineup investigations so as to carefully avoid influencing the
selection of a suspect, and on the other hand, the overzealous officer
who inappropriately suggests information to a witness and who pushes
an identification witness for more certainty than the witness has. Some
officers carefully record both inculpatory and exculpatory information.
Other officers tend to brush aside exculpatory statements and record
principally inculpatory ones, failing to properly appreciate that while
some exculpatory information may turn out to be true (or believed by
a jury) and thus lead to exoneration, some seemingly exculpatory
information might be shown to be false and thus undercut the credibility
of the accused. However, falsity in responding to police questions
concerning a homicide is not a definitive indication of guilt; even
innocent persons sometimes lie for a variety of reasons when questioned
about their activities and whereabouts at the time of a slaying.
Every good district attorney, exercising his or her best judgment, has
occasionally told detectives seeking the filing of a homicide charge, "You
may have the right person, but you don't have the right evidence," or,
when appropriate, "You've got the wrong person." It is sad for both the
accused and the community when a prosecutor, for want of experience
or skill or because of a flawed investigation, files a murder charge against
an innocent person. Even more sad is the ineluctable reality that issuing
homicide charges is a human enterprise and even the most experienced,
capable and conscientious prosecutor, concerned for justice, working with
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a competent team of upright investigators, can make a mistake in relying
on an erroneous identification, in misreading circumstantial evidence, in
believing a lying co-conspirator or err in good faith in some other
fashion and improvidently issue a murder charge against an innocent
person.
Confidence that the great writ of habeas corpus stands as a guarantee
against erroneous conviction is eroding. From the Supreme Court
perspective, as Mr. Justice Blackmun stated in Callens v. Collins,72 "the
Court has 'erected unprecedented and unwarranted barriers' to the
federal judiciary's review of the judicial claims of capital defendants."73
Thereafter, Blackmun cited a series of Supreme Court cases which have
materially reduced the reach of habeas corpus.74 Further, both the
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate
are moving aggressively to diminish the reach of the Federal Habeas
Corpus statute.7 5  On March 15, 1996, H.R. 2703,76 a gutted anti-
terrorism bill still containing sections cutting back on federal statutory
habeas corpus, passed the House by a vote of 229-191."7 Earlier, the
House had rejected an effort by liberal North Carolina Representative
Melvin Watt, who represents a district with a majority of black voters,
and conservative Idaho Representative Helen Chenowith, who had
defended the militia movement, in their effort to strike from the bill the
habeas corpus sections.78 Chenowith reminded the House that the
limits would bear not only on death row inmates but also to those
"wrongfully prosecuted for exercising their constitutional right to bear
and keep arms."79  H.R. 2703 has been referred to a conference
committee as has been S. 73580 which earlier passed the Senate and
contains federal habeas corpus statutory changes similar to those in H.R.
2703. Former United States Attorney Generals Benjamin R. Civiletti,
72. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
73. Callens, 114 S. Ct. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 112
S. Ct. 2514, 2525 (1992)).
74. Id. Extensive treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Others
have ably treated this issue. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases,
73 B.U. L. REV. 759, 794 (1995);
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1996).
76. H.R. 2703, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
77. John E. Yang, House Pares, Then Passes Crime, Terrorism Measure, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 15, 1996, at A4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
[Vol. 79:649
OPPOSING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Jr. and Elliot L. Richardson have called on Congress to reject these
proposed limitations on federal habeas corpus statutes.8' Expectations
that Congress will heed the call of Civiletti and Richardson are not
sanguine. It appears probable, whether constitutional or not, that
Congress will diminish the statutory reach of federal habeas corpus even
as the Supreme Court develops ever more labyrinthine procedures for
a defendant to adequately protect his or her habeas corpus rights.
POLITICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
A broad perspective of the power of politics and the death penalty
in the criminal justice system can be derived from examining Harris v.
Alabama.2 The Court examined an Alabama capital punishment
scheme, similar to that proposed in the Wisconsin bills, which permitted
the trial judge to overrule the jury recommendation as to whether a
convicted defendant should be executed or sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole.' In Harris, the trial jury had recommended by
a seven to five vote that the defendant be imprisoned for life without
parole but the court instead imposed the death penalty.' The majority
opinion, in upholding the death sentence, noted that "Alabama's
sentencing scheme has yielded some ostensibly surprising statistics," 5
and quoted a report of the Alabama Prison Project, which stated that
"there have been only 5 cases in which the judge rejected an advisory
verdict of death, compared to 47 instances where the judge imposed a
death sentence over a jury recommendation of life."86 In a stinging
dissent, Justice Stevens attributed the explanation to politics:
The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may
be "too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who
covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must
constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty. Alabama trial
judges face partisan election every six years. The danger that
they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence
in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted
by judges beholden to King George III.'
81. Benjamin R. Civiletti and Elliot L. Richardson, The Constitution on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1996, at A2.
82. 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
83. Id. at 1033.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1036.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens noted statistics in Florida indicating that judges there
had overridden jury recommendations of life in prison and imposed
death sentences 134 times, a substantially higher number than the 51
instances in which they had overridden jury recommendations of capital
punishment and imposed life imprisonment.' In Indiana, "judges had
used overrides to impose eight death sentences and only four life
sentences.
89
Wisconsin judges, who will face the same options as judges in
Alabama, Florida, and Indiana are elected every six years.' ° In
Delaware, where judges do not stand for election, the first seven times
judges used the recently provided override power they overturned jury
recommendations of death and imposed life sentences.9' The figures
speak for themselves, and are a testimony to the power of electoral
politics on the judiciary.
In the Wisconsin 1994 attorney general's race, the challenger
identified as a key issue his support of capital punishment and the
incumbent's opposition to it.' It can be safely anticipated that in
district attorney races across the state, the same issue will be raised.
The danger arises not from the stated position of the district attorney,
either for or against capital punishment, but that the prosecutor will be
guided not by the appropriate legal considerations of a particular case
but rather by extraneous pressures that should not influence the charging
decision as to whether to file for capital punishment. The discretion of
the district attorney is broad and subject to almost no control or judicial
review.9' The burden of proving that a district attorney has abused his
or her discretion in seeking the death penalty because of political
ambition or community pressure will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible to prove.94
88. Id. at 1040 n.8 (citations omitted).
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 7; WIS. STAT. § 753.01 (1993-94).
91. Bright & Keenan, supra note 74, at 794 (footnotes omitted).
92. Amy Rinard & Mary Zahn, Doyle Wins Re-election Handily, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL,
Nov. 9, 1994, at 12A.
93. State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378-79, 166 N.W.2d 255, 260
(1969); accord Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 328-32, 212 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1973).
94. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987) ("[T]he policy considerations
behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the impropriety of our requiring
prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties, 'often years after they were
made."' (citations omitted)): id. at 311-12 ("[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion to
provide individualized justice is 'firmly entrenched in American law.' . . . [A] prosecutor can
decline to charge, offer a plea bargain, or decline to seek a death penalty in any particular
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Thirty-two years in the prosecution field have persuaded this writer
that most district attorneys are conscientious about their responsibilities;
they attempt to prosecute only those persons they believe have truly
committed the charged offense, usually employ a charging standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt when probable cause would be
sufficient, and are genuinely appalled upon discovering they have
prosecuted an innocent person or convicted an accused of a higher
degree of crime than appropriate. Unfortunately, a few prosecutors fall
measurably below such standards. Some murder cases, by virtue of the
status of the offender (often low, rarely high) the status of the victim, or
the heinous nature of the offense, command the attention of the media
and deeply stir the passions of the public. The less-than-ethical
prosecutor, seeking to assure retention of position, or beset by vaulting
ambition to rise to higher office,95 may seize upon such a situation to
initiate either an ill-founded charge seeking capital punishment or
overcharge a case in order to invoke capital punishment. There can be
no doubt that the district attorney announcing a capital charge before
news cameras, pressing the case in Wisconsin courts where still and TV
cameras are allowed, and then vehemently pressing after conviction for
capital punishment before the jury and the cameras, can emerge as a folk
hero. In a high profile homicide case, a pusillanimous prosecutor,
yielding to pressure from the press or perceived community demand for
action, may bring a capital punishment prosecution lacking commensu-
rate merit, potentially resulting in conviction and execution. On occasion
case.... Of course, 'the power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,'. . . but a
capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency 'would be
totally alien to our notions of criminal justice."' (citations omitted)); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("selective prosecution" not found even though government
prosecuted for failure to register for Selective Service only those whose refusal to register was
"vocal."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
95. That a district attorney should have the ambition for higher office is perfectly
appropriate. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown rose from elected San Francisco District Attorney to
Attorney General, and then Governor of California. Earl Warren rose from elected District
Attorney of Alameda County to Attorney General, then Governor of California, and finally
to Chief Justice of the United States. Thomas Dewey rose from the position of Manhattan
District Attorney to Governor of New York and 1948 Republican candidate for President of
the United States. Francis McGovern rose from Milwaukee County District Attorney to
Governor of Wisconsin. Robert "Fighting Bob" LaFollette rose from Dane County District
Attorney to Governor of Wisconsin to United States Senator to candidate of the Progressive
Party for President of the United States in 1924. The district attorneys of Wisconsin have
historically risen to various levels of the State judiciary in substantial numbers.
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a young and inexperienced prosecutor, such as are not infrequently
elected in rural counties, may be induced by well-intentioned but ill-
advising senior law enforcement officials to press a capital punishment
charge on inadequate evidence.
Prosecutors concerned with justice are troubled by fact patterns that
can tempt the conscience of the jury. Such a situation arises when a
child has been kidnapped, sexually assaulted and slain, or a vulnerable
victim has been tortured before being killed, or a respected police officer
has been murdered on duty, but the evidence supporting the charge
against an unattractive or minority accused falls short of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. An articulate prosecutor senses that a closing
argument artfully orchestrated to stoke the passions of the jury but not
so fevered as to trigger reversal will surely tempt those jurors to convict,
overriding doubts that ought to persist due to deficiencies in the
evidence. In such cases, often only the district attorney will know what
the defense attorney, the judge, and the investigating officers may
suspect (and the jury never perceive) that the district attorney has
compromised the precious integrity of his or her office in filing a charge
that ought not have been brought.
The prosecuting attorney initiating a capital punishment charge will
learn more about the case as trial preparation proceeds. Interviews of
witnesses, testimony at the preliminary hearing, receipt of the more
detailed autopsy protocol, and evidence analysis from reports coming in
from the crime lab bring a better understanding of the facts. Further, as
the defense emerges with the approach of trial, the prosecutor often
learns of aspects of the case not known at the time of issuance.
Occasionally, problems in the case, whether with a prosecution witness'
lack of credibility, disappearance of a witness, or suppression of evidence
will arise. Now better informed, the prosecutor may determine that the
crime was overcharged as a capital offense and that a less serious charge
is more appropriate to the facts and that a negotiated plea to a lesser
charge would better protect the interests of the public. Alternatively, the
prosecutor may determine that justice would be better served by simply
filing a lower charge. However, in the minds of some commentators and
part of the public, the initial charge brought by the prosecutor, at that
stage at which he or she was least informed, is misperceived as being
garbed with a pristine quality, and any reduction therefrom appears to
cast the district attorney in an adverse light and to compromise the
integrity of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor may fear adverse
publicity before trial if there is a reduction of charge or after conviction
on a lesser charge during victim allocution, when the grieving family may
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fiercely criticize the district attorney for the decision to reduce the
charge. Concern must arise that in the glare of public attention that
would be natural in a capital punishment case, a less-than-ethical
prosecutor would proceed on a capital punishment charge, possibly to
conviction, when a lower charge in fact ought justly to have been pressed
instead.
In some cases, an elected district attorney, not wishing to reach a
politically unpalatable (but proper) decision to reduce a charge justifies
inaction by saying, "Let the jury decide." While this may appear to be
graced with a patina of deference to the jury system, it is in fact an
abdication of the district attorney's responsibilities. The jury will rarely,
if ever, know as much about the case as the prosecutor and without the
district attorney's training and skills will fail to appreciate inadequacies
in the evidence or, moved by revulsion stirred by the facts, will feel
strongly prompted to convict. Although ethically the prosecutor may be
constrained from articulating an opinion on guilt, it must be assumed
that most jurors seeing a prosecutor present a case and argue for
conviction will conclude that the prosecutor firmly believes the accused
to be guilty, or why else would a prosecutor of integrity be arguing for
conviction? Were the prosecutor to stand before the jury and candidly
say, "I struggled with this case myself and had some doubts about
whether it should be a capital punishment charge or a lesser homicide,
and determined to let you decide," which would very accurately capture
the ethos of "leaving it to the jury," he or she would bring an entirely
different presentation to the jury than the prosecutor, entertaining the
same reservations but quietly deciding to "leave it to the jury," who
argues aggressively for conviction. Recognizing that a capital punish-
ment case is possibly overcharged, and then "leaving it to the jury" while
at the same time pressing for conviction, thereby leading the jury to
divine that the prosecutor thoroughly believes in the prosecution,
seriously lacks the integrity that ought to attend upon a matter as grave
as a capital punishment prosecution. The not uncommon situation in
which a young assistant district attorney, lacking confidence in his or her
own judgment, prosecuting a battery charge filed by a senior assistant
and struggling to determine whether the charge ought be reduced to a
disorderly conduct charge and deciding to "leave it to the jury" poses its
worst danger in initiating what may become a habit and later be applied
to more serious charges.
The ABA Standards For Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and
Defense Function provides that, "In making the decision to prosecute, the
prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or political advantages
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or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his
or her record of convictions., 96  The NDAA National Prosecution
Standards provide that factors which should not be considered in the
charging decision include "[p]ersonal advantages which prosecution may
bring to the prosecutor"9 7 and "[p]olitical advantages which prosecution
may bring to the prosecutor."98 These standards properly summon a
prosecutor to ideals. Certainly, it will almost inevitably occur to an
elected prosecutor reviewing a murder case that his or her personal and
political interests could be well served by a highly publicized capital
punishment prosecution. One would expect that a community, even one
fevered by a heinous homicide, would not want its prosecutor's decision
guided by that prosecutor's personal and political interests.99 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in O'Neil v. State,"° in words echoed in
Supreme Court decisions in many other states, summoned its district
attorneys to high standards:
The district attorney represents the commonwealth,-a
commonwealth which demands no victims,--a commonwealth
which "seeks justice only,-equal and impartial justice .... It is
as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent
man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes."
A prosecutor should act not as a partisan eager to convict, but
as an officer of the court, whose duty it is to aid in arriving at the
truth in every case. His object, like that of the court, should be
simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of
professional success.
No court has taken a higher view of the dignity of the office
of district attorney than this court. "He is an officer of the
state,... to see that the criminal laws of the state are honestly
and impartially administered. .. ." The district attorney is not a
mere legal attorney. "He is a sworn minister of justice......
96. PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 58, § 3-3.9(d).
97. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 59, § 42.4.
98. Id.
99. Kenneth Bresler in Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 941 (1994), highlights the ethical conflicts that an elected district attorney potentially
confronts between his own or her own political interests and the duty to the state to do justice
first.
100. 189 Wis. 259, 207 N.W. 280 (1926).
101. Id. at 261-62, 207 N.W. at 281 (citations omitted).
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These words were occasioned by comments made by the district attorney
during final argument that the court described as "improper and
inflammatory statements" in a prosecution of a man for taking indecent
liberties with a girl under the age of sixteen years. Might the district
attorney's remarks have been even more incendiary had the child been
slain and the case a capital punishment prosecution?
That some district attorneys are and will be influenced by personal
and political considerations is beyond cavil. In the 1916 Preparedness
Day Parade in San Francisco, California, a bomb exploded killing ten
citizens and injuring others."°2 Tensions in San Francisco already ran
high between those urging entry into World War I to aid England, the
Irish angry at British suppression of the recent Dublin Easter Rebellion
and opposed to assisting the English, those agitated by the massing of
troops preparing to pursue Poncho Villa into Mexico, and persisting
fierce antipathies flowing from bitter management resistance to labor
organizing efforts in the city. 3 The San Francisco District Attorney,
in a highly dubious case, secured multiple first degree murder count
indictments against Tom Mooney, Warren Billings and others. The cases
were prosecuted to conviction and sentence of execution for Mooney and
life sentence for Billings."14 Several years later, James Brennan, the
Assistant District Attorney in charge of the prosecution of Billings
stated: "Had I been a juror sitting in the case and heard the evidence
which I myself presented, I could not and would not have voted for
Billings' conviction. There was the element of doubt. There was
wanting the final link in the chain forging Billings to the crime.'15
Brennan further stated, in words unfairly tarnishing most district
attorneys but highlighting the deficiencies of some:
Like all prosecutors, I was blind to all but the pursuit-the
chase which would end with the conviction of my quarry.
I was cursed with the psychology of the prosecution. To my
mind, and it is in the mind of every district attorney and his
assistants, conviction is the only goal.
Unconsciously, and with no wrong intent, the prosecutor
retains the facts which further his case. Others, perhaps vital to
102. RICHARD H. FROST, THE MOONEY CASE 86-87 (1968).
103. See id. at 19-70.
104. The history of the Mooney-Billings prosecution is the subject of several books, two
of which are FROST, supra note 102 and CURT GENTRY, FRAME-UP (1967). Additionally, the
text of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), captures in part the intensity of the
prosecutorial pursuit of Mooney.
105. GENTRY, supra note 104, at 281.
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the proof of innocence of the accused, are cast aside. He is a
keen-scented hound on a trail. He has become obsessed with his
case. Given the slightest evidence supporting his theories, which
he has already framed in his own mind, he weaves these into a
web of circumstances which are ofttimes damning to the accused,
and against which even the innocent may not be able to
stand. I06
Brennan went on to state:
Witnesses whose testimony is wholly false or founded on little
fact can make almost any case for such a prosecutor. The fair
minded district attorney constantly has to guard against them.
I would say that, as a general rule, no man wants to put an
innocent person in prison. The prosecutor's motives can not in
a majority of cases be questioned.
But he is biased toward a conviction, and this is uppermost in
his mind. Every public prosecutor wants to make a record. He
sees as his goal political preferment, applause of his constituents,
his personal aggrandizement. This can be gained only by
conviction of the accused, against whom the public mind in
sensational cases has already been poisoned."°7
Brennan concluded that:
The case has been a nightmare since the date of the trial. My
motives have been misconstrued, and in view of my own personal
doubts as to the guilt of Billings, I regard it as an evil day in my
life that I was given charge of the prosecution."
The quote captures the dark side of a few district attorneys, and
highlights the problems that may arise for some district attorneys in high
profile cases, but does substantial injustice to the vast majority of
prosecutors who, it is hoped, would sooner forgo public office than
compromise their integrity and corrupt their office.
In Wainwright v. Witt,"° Justice Brennan stated:
Passions, as we all know, can run to the extreme when the State
tries one accused of a barbaric act against society, or one accused
106. Id.
107. FROST, supra note 102, at 344.
108. Id. (citations omitted). Brennan was quoted in Call in November 13, 1920. Frost
notes that "[i]n 1930 Brennan testified that [Edgar T.] Gleeson [a reporter for Call] had
garbled this account, but Gleeson responded that Brennan had never complained of it to him
or to the Call.... Brennan acknowledged later that Gleeson was 'probably one of the most
respected men of the newspaper fraternity.'" Id. (citations omitted). Eventually, confidence
in the integrity of the prosecutions against Mooney and Billings collapsed and both men were
released from prison.
109. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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of a crime that-for whatever reason-inflames the community.
Pressures on the government to secure a conviction, to "do
something," can overwhelm even those of good conscience....
When prosecutors and judges are elected, or when they harbor
political ambitions, such pressures are particularly dangerous.n °
It is an unpalatable reality that eventually, over time, such a capital case
will come into the hands of a prosecutor in Wisconsin. When execution
may eventually follow, the danger of a miscarriage of justice occurring
in a prosecution conceived between publicpassion and political ambition
is high.
RACE MAT=ERS
If there is any place in this land that ought to be free of racism, it is
the courthouse. If there is any type of case from which every vestige of
racism ought be extirpated, it is a capital punishment case. Yet, racism
persists. In Strauder v. West Virginia,"' the Court struck down a
prosecution of a black man for murder on grounds that African-
Americans, on the basis of their race, had been excluded from the grand
jury that handed down the indictment."' In Rose v. Mitchell,"3 a
similar challenge was raised by two African-Americans indicted for
murder in Tennessee. The Court stated:
For we also cannot deny that, 114 years after the close of the War
Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and
other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the
administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps
today that discrimination takes a form more subtle than before.
But it is not less real or pernicious."
4
The impact of racism, when present in a district attorney's decision
as to whom to charge, at what level to charge, whether to seek capital
punishment, and whether to negotiate a plea to a lower charge and avoid
capital punishment cannot be exaggerated. Racism can also play a role
in the district attorney's exercise of peremptory strikes to remove certain
persons from a jury panel. Racism, of course, can play a role as well in
a jury's decision as to guilt and as to the imposition of capital punish-
ment.
110. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
112. Id. at 312.
113. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
114. Id. at 558-59.
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Before Coker v. Georgia,"5 in which the United States Supreme
Court struck down capital punishment as an unconstitutional penalty for
rape, 455 persons had been executed in the United States for that
offense. 16  Almost 90% of those executed, over 400, were black.1 17
A study by Wolfgang and Riedel, not surprisingly, found that race was
the critical differential in the capital punishment rape cases they studied
and that black men who raped white women stood a higher chance of
being sentenced to capital punishment than any other racial combination
provided." 8
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 9 the Court reviewed the conviction and
imposition of capital punishment on a black defendant for the slaying of
a white police officer during the robbery of a furniture store.20 By a
five to four decision, 2' the majority rejected the defendant's claim of
unconstitutional denial of equal protection. In evidence before the Court
was the Baldus Study, a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis."m
This study was assumed to be statistically valid by the justices. Still, that
assumption did not include, according to the majority, the fact that the
study showed race actually entered into any sentencing decision."
The analysis showed that defendants killing whites are 4.3 times more
likely to be sentenced to death in Georgia than defendants killing
blacks. 24  The dissent noted that "just under 59%-almost six in
ten-defendants comparable to McCleskey would not have received the
death penalty if their victims had been black."'5 The dissent further
noted that "data unadjusted for other mitigating and aggravating
factors"'126 showed that the capital sentencing rate for all white-victim
cases was 120% greater than the rate for black-victim cases,1 27 that
115. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
116. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1981, at 9 (1982).
117. Id.
118. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Racial Discrimination, Rape, and the Death
Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 194, 201 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d. ed. 1982).
119. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
120. Id. at 283.
121. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. The dissenting justices were Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 282.
122. Id. at 286-87.
123. Id. at 291 n.7.
124. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 325 (footnote omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 326.
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"blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate
of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who
kill blacks, 12 1 that "prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of
black defendants with white victims, but for only 15% of black defen-
dants with black victims and only 19% of white defendants with black
victims., 129 That race played a role in the Georgia criminal justice
system in capital punishment cases appears beyond cavil.
In Furman v. Georgia,'30 and the accompanying cases, the statutory
capital punishment schemes of Georgia and Texas were struck down with
the Court holding "that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,"1 3' essentially
because of the arbitrary and capricious manner in which unguided
discretion was exercised to impose it on a few. 132 In Gregg v. Geor-
gia,133 one of the grounds of attack on the new Georgia statute was
that it failed to control the broad discretion of the district attorney,
noting that "the state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those
persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea
bargain with them.' ' "3  Responding in a concurring opinion, Justice
White held:
Petitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless
fashion in deciding which cases to try as capital felonies is
unsupported by any facts. Petitioner simply asserts that since
prosecutors have the power not to charge capital felonies they
will exercise that power in a standardless fashion. This is
untenable. Absent facts to the contrary it cannot be assumed that
prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors
other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury
would impose the death penalty if it convicts. 35
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 36 the defendant argued that the substantial
statistical findings of the Baldus Study should be relied upon to find that
Georgia prosecutors were using the unconstitutional consideration of the
defendant's race and more so the victim's race in determining when to
128. Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
131. Id. at 239-40.
132. See, e.g., id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
133. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
134. Id. at 199.
135. Id at 225 (White, J., concurring).
136. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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seek capital punishment.'37 The defendant urged that the Court's
reliance on statistics as proof of racial discrimination in employment
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as in Bazemore v.
Friday,'38 and in venire-selection cases such as Whitus v. Georgia,3 9
should apply for a finding of racial discrimination in the prosecutor's use
of discretion in selecting cases for capital punishment.4 '
On various grounds, the court rejected the use of statistical evidence
to prove prosecutorial racial discrimination. 4' The Court required that
the defendant would have to prove "'the existence of purposeful
discrimination.""' 4  He would also have to prove that the "decision-
makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."'43 The Court
noted, however, that McCleskey offered "no evidence specific to his own
case that would support an inference racial considerations played a part
in his sentence."'" The Court held that "the policy considerations
behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the
impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek
death penalties, 'often years after they were made.""4  The Court
further held that "[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would
infer that the discretion has been abused."' 46 The Court noted that "a
prosecutor can decline to charge, offer a plea bargain or decline to seek
a death sentence in any particular case,"' 47 and that "the power to be
lenient [also] is the power to discriminate."'" The Court found that
the Baldus Study was "clearly insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decision makers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory
purpose,"' 149 and that "[a]t most, the Baldus Study indicates a discrep-
ancy that appears to correlate with race."'50  Clearly, under the
137. Id. at 291-93.
138. Id. at 293-94 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part)).
139. Id. at 292 (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
140. Id. at 291-96.
141. Id. at 292-97.
142. Id. at 292 (quoting Whitus, 385 U.S. at 550).
143. Id. at 292.
144. Id. at 292-93.
145. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 297.
147. Id. at 312 (citation omitted).
148. Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
149. Id. at 297.
150. Id. at 312.
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majority opinion, a defendant would virtually have to prove the district
attorney said that he or she was pursuing capital punishment against a
particular defendant because that defendant was black or because the
victim was white. This is an unreasonable burden of proof which even
in a large urban center with many murders and a heterogeneous
population could rarely be met though racism might in fact be playing
a role in a district attorney's prosecution of capital punishment cases.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, accused the majority of seeking to impose
a "crippling burden of proof" on a defendant."' Both Brennan and
Blackmun, in their dissents, deemed use of statistical evidence to prove
racial discrimination proper.'52 Blackmun noted McCleskey's claim
that racial factors influenced various steps of the capital punishment
scheme and observed that "[t]he primary decision maker at each of the
intervening steps of the process is the prosecutor, the quintessential state
actor in a criminal proceeding."' 53  Blackmun focused much of his
dissent on the role of the prosecutor,'54 and stated that McCleskey
"presented evidence of numerous decisions impermissibly affected by
racial factors over a significant number of cases. The exhaustive
evidence in this case certainly demands an inquiry into the prosecutor's
actions."' 55
No fair minded prosecutor, white or black, ought be able to read
McCleskey without sensing grave reservations and without knowing that
even in the halls of justice, in an issue as grave as capital punishment,
race matters.
156
151. Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 327-28; id. at 350-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 356-65.
155. Id. at 364.
156. The defendant Warren McCleskey appeared again before the United States
Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). On that appeal, McCleskey argued
that his alleged statement to fellow inmate Offie Evans introduced at his trial was secured in
violation of his right of assistance to counsel as defined within Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964). McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 472. It had been learned that Evans had been
promised by a detective that the detective would say a "word" for Evans before Evans was
moved in the jail to a cell from which he could talk to McCleskey and where Evans secured
the alleged statement of McCleskey that he had fired the bullet that killed Officer Schlatt. Id.
The Supreme Court ruled in this later case that McCleskey had earlier knowledge of this
information, and his failure to promptly pursue it constituted an abuse of Federal habeas
corpus and the Court accordingly denied relief to McCleskey. I. at 502-03. In a final
clemency proceeding before the Georgia Board of Pardons on September 23, 1991, two
members from the jury which had imposed the death penalty on McCleskey told the board
they would not have voted for the death penalty had they known at the trial that Evans was
a police informant who was offered the chance of a lighter sentence in exchange for testifying
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The United States General Accounting Office, in its Report to Senate
and House Committees on the Judiciary,t57 set forth its conclusion from
a careful review of twenty-eight studies relating to capital punishment
cases:
Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of evidence
indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and
imposition of the death penalty after the Furman decision.
In 82% of the studies, race of victim was found to influence
the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving
the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to
be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered
blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. The
findings held for high, medium, and low quality studies.
The race of victim influence was found at all stages of the
criminal justice system process, although there were variations
among studies as to whether there was a race of victim influence
at specific stages. The evidence for the race of victim influence
was stronger for the earlier stages of the judicial process (e.g.,
prosecutorial decision to charge defendant with a capital offense,
decision to proceed to trial rather than plea bargain) than in later
stages. This was because the earlier stages were comprised of
to McCleskey's alleged statement that he had shot the police officer. Inmate Whose Appeal
Shook System Faces Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at A20. One of the two jurors,
Robert Burnette, a forty-nine-year-old postal worker, stated his belief that "If you take a life,
death is the right punishment. But when you take that person's life, you have to be sure
beyond a shadow of a doubt that person committed the crime, and I don't feel that way about
this case. If we knew more about Offie Evans, his credibility would have been shot to hell."
Id. The pardon board denied clemency and McCleskey was executed shortly thereafter on
Sept. 25, 1991. Mark Curriden, McClesky Put to Death After Hours of Delays, Final Apology,
ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 26, 1991, at D3. Final sympathy must lie with Police Officer Fred
Schlatt and the family who suffered his violent loss. However, Warren McCleskey's execution
is a tragedy as well because it is a low mark in judicial acceptance of the racist reality within
capital punishment that whether one is executed for a murder or not may well depend on the
race of the offender or the race of the victim. Mr. Justice Powell, who cast the deciding vote
and wrote the majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). later advised his
biographer, John C. Jeffres, Jr. that he had "come to think that capital punishment should be
abolished." David Von Drehle, The American Way of Justice, WASHINGTON POST NATIONAL
WEEKLY EDITION, Feb. 13-19, 1995, at 9. When asked by the biographer if there was a case
he wished he had decided otherwise, Powell responded, "McCleskey v. Kemp." Id. McCleskey
v. Kemp is a case one can only hope will some day join the sodden ash heap of Dred Scott,
Plessy, and Korematsu.
157. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO SENATE AND HOUSE
COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, FEBRUARY 1990, DEATH PENALTY SENTEN-
CING-RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES, 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90
(daily ed. May 24, 1990).
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larger samples allowing for more rigorous analyses. 5
In March of 1994, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, published a study 5 9 of persons
brought under the "drug kingpin" death penalty provisions of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988.'60 The report noted:
Three-quarters of those convicted of participating in a drug
enterprise under the general provisions of § 848 have been white
and only about 24% of the defendants have been black.
However, of those chosen for death penalty prosecutions under
this section, just the opposite is true: 78% of the defendants have
been black and only 11% of the defendants have been white.'6'
The report went on to note:
[E]vidence of racial discrimination in the application of capital
punishment continues. Nearly 40% of those executed since 1976
have been black, even though blacks constitute only 12% of the
population. And in almost every death penalty case, the race of
the victim is white. Last year alone, 89% of the death sentences
carried out involved white victims, even though 50% of the
homicides in this country have black victims. Of the 229
executions that have occurred since the death penalty was
reinstated, only one has involved a white defendant for the
murder of a black person.162
The report also found that of the thirty-seven defendants prosecuted
under the "drug kingpin" death penalty law, "[tjwenty-nine of the
defendants have been black and 4 have been Hispanic."163
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Loving
v. United States.'" Loving, a military private, argues that capital
158. Id. (footnote omitted). Some studies and commentators focus directly on the role
of the district attorney. See Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the
Death Penal: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 L. & Soc'y REV. 437 (1984);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases,
19 L. & SoC'Y REV. 587 (1985); WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 193-269,340-48; Developments in the Law: Race and
the Criminal Process, 101 .HARv. L. REV. 1472. 1520-57, 1588-95.
159. SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONST. RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D
CONG., 2D SESS., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS 1988-
1994 (Comm. Print 1994) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter RACIAL DISPARITIES].
160. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)-(q) (West 1996).
161. RACIAL DISPARITIES, supra note 159, at 2 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 6 (Table
10-Convictions 1987-90) (1993)).
162. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 3.
164. 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
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punishment has historically been unequally applied in the military and
is therefore unconstitutional. 65 As of November of 1995, six of the
eight men in the military death row are African-American." 6 During
World War II, while blacks accounted for less than ten percent of the
army population, fifty-five of the seventy soldiers executed in Europe
were African-American.167 In eleven of the twelve executions conduct-
ed by the military since 1951, the man executed was African-Ameri-
can.' 6' In every case the victim was white.69
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 7' addressing the issues raised by the racial
disparity evidence, the Court stated that "McCleskey's arguments are
best presented to the legislative bodies .... Legislatures also are better
qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms
of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the Courts[.] '""' At its annual convention in 1988, the
American Bar Association, which has never taken a position either
favoring or opposing capital punishment, adopted a policy opposing
"discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of the race of either the
victim or the defendant" and supported "enactment of federal and state
legislation which strives to eliminate any racial discrimination in capital
sentencing which may exist."'172
165. Dwight Sullivan, Military Death Row: Separate, Not Equal, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6,
1995, at A19-20. See also Brief for Petitioner, Loving v. United States (No. 94 - 1966), 1995
WL 668007.
166. Sullivan, supra note 165, at A19.
167. Id.
168. Id. at A19-A20.
169. Id. at A20.
170. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
171. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
172. SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1988 A.B.A. ANN.
MEETING 35. The complete text of the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section's
resolution was:
The Section's second recommendation (Report No. 109), presented jointly with the
Sections of Criminal Justice and General Practice, was revised by the proponents and
approved by voice vote. As approved, it reads:
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association opposes discrimination in
capital sentencing on the basis of the race of either the victim or the defendant.
Be It Further Resolved, That the American Bar Association supports the
enactment of federal and state legislation which strives to eliminate any racial
discrimination in capital sentencing which may exist.
Be It Further Resolved, That this resolution does not create a position for the
American Bar Association on whether or not capital punishment is an appropriate
criminal sanction.
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Attempts to enact "The Racial Justice Act," (RJA) which would
effect such a legislative change, were unsuccessful in the 100th and 101st
Sessions of Congress.173 In the 103rd Congress, the RJAI74 was
designed to respond to the Supreme Court's invitation in McCleskey,75
by amending Title 28 of the United States Code by adding new sections
2921-24. The central thrust of the RJA was captured in section 2921(a),
which read: "No person shall be put to death under color of State or
Federal law in the execution of a sentence that was imposed based on
race."'' 76 The RJA would allow the use of valid statistical evidence in
death cases to show that a particular defendant's sentence was based on
race. 77  The prosecutor would have full opportunity to dispute the
relevance and validity of the statistical and other evidence to show that
there was no racial pattern of sentencing or that, even if there was one,
the particular case under scrutiny did not fall within it.'78 The pro-
posed Act expressly required a defendant to present valid evidence
"demonstrating that, at the time the death sentence was imposed, race
was a statistically significant factor."179 Such evidence was to take into
account all relevant statutory aggravating factors.'8 On rebuttal, the
prosecution burden of proof would be mere preponderance of the
evidence.' A defendant successfully invoking the Racial Justice Act
would succeed only in overturning the sentence and not the convic-
tion."2
On April 20, 1994, the House of Representatives, with strong support
from the Black Caucus, the Hispanic Caucus, and the Democratic
leadership, 3 passed the Bill 217-212."8 The House report, which
173. SUBCOMM. ON CIV. & CONST. RTS., HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 103D CONG. 2D
SESs. BRIEFING BOOK ON THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT 3.
174. H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
175. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1994).
176. H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. ch. 177, § 2921(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
177. Id. § 2921(b)-(d).
178. Id. § 2921(e).
179. Id. § 2921(b).
180. Id. § 2921(d).
181. Id. § 2921(e).
182. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 175, at 4. Congress derives its power to stop racially-
biased capital sentencing in the states from the 14th Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5.
183. House Backs Death Penalty Defense Tactic, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Apr. 21, 1994,
at 3A.
184. 140 CONG. REC. H2528-33 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994). The house voted against an
amendment that would have struck the RJA from a larger crime bill. Id.
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included dissenting views, captured the issues in dispute."5  The
majority report noted that in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia,8 6 the Su-
preme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional as then applied
because imposition was in an arbitrary and capricious manner.87 The
report went on to note:
A number of states responded to Furman by adopting "guided
discretion" statutes, which require jurors to focus on specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in choosing from the
many homicides the few cases that will receive the death penalty.
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, the Supreme Court
held that such statutes offered the possibility of eliminating bias
and whim from capital sentencing. "Absent facts to the con-
trary," Justice White observed prosecutors must be presumed to
exercise their charging duties properly.
Eighteen years after Gregg the facts are in, and it is clear that
the guided discretion statutes have failed in their objective of
eliminating bias from capital sentencing. Recent evidence
overwhelmingly and consistently demonstrates that death
sentencing decisions in some jurisdictions are still influenced by
race.
88
Apparently adverting to prosecutors and judges, the report noted, "[F]ew
people today would admit an intent to discriminate. Therefore, the
Supreme Court has usually recognized that the existence of illegal
discrimination can be established by showing that the results of a
decisionmaking process are discriminatory."'89 The Judiciary Commit-
tee supported its recommendation that statistical evidence be used by
stating:
Statistical analysis are [sic] generally accepted as reliably measur-
ing the influence of racial discrimination in complex decision-
making processes. The Racial Justice Act is consistent with other
civil rights laws under which an inference of racial discrimination
can be established through the use of statistical evidence showing
a significant racially discriminatory effect."
Many disagree with the use of statistics, however. As the dissenting
committee members stated:
185. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 175, at 1-12, 14-17.
186. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
187. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 175, at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 5; Ralph Z. Hallow, Death-Row "Racial Justice" Splits Democrats, WASH.
TIMES, May 2, 1994, at Al.
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We are opposed [to] the "Racial Justice Act" because its likely
effect will be the invalidation of every capital sentence now in
effect as well as prevention of the use of capital punishment in
the United States. This is not because racial prejudice permeates
the criminal justice system, but because the proposal would
impose unrealistic burdens of proof on the prosecution in
response to alleged statistical disparities.'9'
The National District Attorneys Association vigorously opposed
introduction of the Racial Justice Act into the Senate version of the
Crime Bill, arguing that its passage would effect abolition of capital
punishment in all states. 92
The issue of the Racial Justice Act threatened passage of crime
legislation keenly desired by President Clinton and the Democratic
leadership.93  Liberals in Congress, particularly members of the
Congressional Black Caucus and the Hispanic Caucus threatened to vote
against the bill if it did not include the Racial Justice Act while
conservatives in the Senate threatened a filibuster if the conference
committee report contained the Act.' 94 On July 20, 1994, Senator
Joseph Biden, then chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that
he lacked the sixty votes necessary to overcome a filibuster and
predicted that the 30 billion dollar crime bill would not pass the Senate
if it contained any version of the Racial Justice Act.'95 On July 26,
1994, Representative Kweisi Mfume, then chairman of the Congressional
Black Caucus, wrote:
Throughout history, minorities have received a disproportion-
ate share of society's harshest punishments, from slavery to
lynchings.
If an individual may use statistics to defend his or her right to
vote, obtain adequate education and gainful employment,
Congress would be remiss to deny an individual the right to use
191. Id. at 14.
192. Letter from William C. O'Malley, President of the NDAA, to all NDAA Board
Members & Prosecutor Coordinators. Apr. 29, 1994 (on file with author). The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 emerged from the Senate without the Racial
Justice Act and was referred to a conference committee. 140 CONG. REC. S6018 (daily ed.
May 19, 1994).
193. Hallow, supra note 190, at Al; William J. Eaton, Crime Bill Stymied by Death
Penalty, MILWAUKEE J., June 27, 1994, at Al.
194. Hallow, supra note 146, at Al.
195. Biden: Racial Justice Act Won't Survive, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 1994, § 1, at 13.
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racially significant statistics if those same statistics would mean
the difference between life imprisonment and death."'96
The conference committee on the crime bill ended its work on July
28, 1994, and cut the Racial Justice Act from the final legislation.Y7
It was reported that, "President Clinton has indicated that he will
implement the provisions of the Act, within the Department of Justice,
by Executive Order and will direct the appointment of a commission to
study the need for further legislation. This compromise was worked out
with the Congressional Black Caucus to end their opposition to the
Crime Bill."'98 In addition to not containing the Racial Justice Act, the
final version of the law"9 signed by President Clinton on September
13, 1994,2" increased to sixty the number of federal crimes which carry
death as a potential punishment.20 ' Gail Hoffman, Director of the
Office of Public Liaison and Governmental Affairs of the United States
Department of Justice, advised that the department "will continue to
work with Congress to ensure that the death penalty is available for
appropriate federal crimes through the adoption of constitutional
procedures which will enable federal prosecutors to seek the death
penalty where appropriate-and will ensure that this penalty is used
fairly and justly."'2° Hoffman went on to state that "the Administra-
tion believes that the greatest possible care must be taken to be certain
that the death penalty is meted out in a fair, even-handed and non-
discriminatory manner. To that end we are committed to working with
Congress to prevent discrimination in the implementation of capital
punishment, or any other aspect of the criminal justice system. 20 3 The
196. Kweisi Mfume, Isn't It Time to Say Yes to Racial Justice?, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1994,
§ 1, at 17.
197. Letter from Newman Flanagan, Executive Director of NDAA, to all NDAA Board
Members & Prosecutor Coordinators, July 28, 1994 (on file with author).
198. Id.
199. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994) [hereinafter Violent Crime Control].
200. 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1789 (Sept. 19, 1994).
201. Violent Crime Control, supra note 199 at 1959-82; Henry J. Reske, A Bigger Role
for the Feds, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 14.
202. Letter from Gail Hoffman, Director, Office of Public Liaison and Intergovernmental
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Jan. 24, 1995 (on file with author).
203. Id. Attorney General Janet Reno on January 27, 1995, issued modifications of the
United States Attorneys' Manual detailing circumstances under which the United States would
seek the death penalty, tightly controlling the decision to her office and a committee she was
appointing, and noting that "[t]he committee will consider all information presented to it,
including any evidence of racial bias against the defendant or evidence that the Department
has engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the administration of the
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defeat of the Racial Justice Act for the present forecloses any serious,
nationwide challenge to the racially disparate sentencing patterns
identified in the studies noted above. Statistics no doubt will continue
to accumulate demonstrating the disparity. Hopefully, sooner rather
than later, the outhouse stench of racism in capital punishment will move
the various states or the nation to remedy this wrong by an enactment
similar to the Racial Justice Act or will drive the United States Supreme
Court to reverse McCleskey v. Kemp.2"
In McCleskey, the Court explained its rejection of McCleskey's racial
disparity claim, noting that "[t]he Eighth Amendment is not limited in
application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties. Thus, if
we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty.""2 5 In a footnote, the Court cited
the existence of studies allegedly demonstrating racial disparity in
sentencing in various types of crimes.2" The Court feared that if racial
disparity in sentencing is permitted to subvert capital punishment, the
presence of racial disparity across the board in all criminal case
sentencing will subvert the whole system of punishment. Rather than
dealing with this issue with a legalistic dance, as five of the justices did
when McCleskey reached the Supreme Court level, a far more candid
and just approach to this painful issue was suggested by Judge Clark in
his dissent in the McCleskey case at the Appeals Court level:
Finally, the State of Georgia also has no compelling interest
to justify a death penalty system that discriminates on the basis
of race. Hypothetically, if a racial bias reflected itself randomly
in 20% of the convictions [in all types of cases], one would not
abolish the criminal justice system. Ways of ridding the system
federal death penalty." 7 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-244 (1995-3 Supp.). Robert
N. Tarman, of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, co-counsel for Michael Murray in United States v.
Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 291 (M.D.Pa. 1994), appeared before the Attorney General's committee
in Washington, D.C. in July 1995 before the trial date and presented the argument as to why
the government should not press for capital punishment for his black client. He was later
advised by the committee that the government would seek life imprisonment instead.
Telephone Interview with Robert N. Tarman (Apr. 5, 1996). It has been alleged by an
attorney who has recently litigated a federal capital punishment case that racial disparity
continues on federal death row and that "the adoption of new death-penalty procedures and
guidelines by the Department of Justice in January 1995 has not helped the situation."
William D. Matthewman, The Racial Disparity on Federal Death Row, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
1996, at A29.
204. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
205. Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
206. Id. at 315 n.38.
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of bias would be sought but absent a showing of bias in a given
case, little else could be done. The societal imperative of
maintaining a criminal justice system to apprehend, punish, and
confine perpetrators of serious violations of the law would
outweigh the mandate that race or other prejudice not infiltrate
the legal process. In other words, we would have to accept that
we are doing the best that can be done in a system that must be
administered by people, with all their conscious and unconscious
biases.
However, such reasoning cannot sensibly be invoked and bias
cannot be tolerated when considering the death penalty, a
punishment that is unique in its finality.2 7
Justice Brennan, in his McCleskey dissent, implied that a different
standard might apply for lesser punishments.2" While such an admis-
sion is acutely embarrassing for a system that lays claim to pristine
integrity, it is accurate and will, hopefully, summon the judges and
lawyers of this nation to the worthy cause of extirpating every vestige of
racism that remains in our criminal justice system.
There can be no doubt that African-Americans have an average
lower income than whites,2" a shorter life span,210 more unemploy-
ment,211 and a greater percentage under the federal poverty level.1 2
While some believe government can do more to alleviate these
situations, few suspect government of actively seeking to impose such
conditions. Tragically, suspicion exists that the government plays just
such a role in the criminal justice system. Indeed, many who have
labored long in the criminal justice system know, supported by a variety
of studies and extensive personal experience, that blacks get the harsher
hand in criminal justice and particularly in capital punishment cases.
In Swain v. Alabama,213 an African-American defendant convicted
of rape appealed on the basis that the prosecutor had used his perempto
ry challenges to strike all blacks from the petit jury and that through the
207. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting), aff'd
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
208. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 342.
209. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK, WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 103-110 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
210. Id. at 50-51.
211. Id. at 108-10.
212. Id. at 105-07.
213. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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use of the peremptory strike system in Talladega County by prosecutors,
no black had served on a petit jury in that county "since about 1950. ',214
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, noting the "very old
credentials" of the peremptory challenge system2 5 and ruled that "we
cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial
of equal protection of the laws., 21 6  The Court further ruled, "we
cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the
prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given
case." 217 The Court noted that the record was insufficient to establish
that prosecutors had used the peremptory system to strike every black
from a petit jury in Talladega County through the years and accordingly
did not rule on that issue.218
In Batson v. Kentucky,1 9 the prosecutor used his, peremptory
challenges to strike all four blacks on the venire leaving only white jurors
to decide the black defendant's case.220 In overturning the conviction,
the Court ruled that:
Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted
peremptory challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that
reason is related to his view concerning the outcome" of the case
to be tried,... the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecu-
tor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or
on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defen-
dant.221
The Court ruled that "[O]nce the defendant makes the requisite
showing, the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion."' Furthermore, "[t]he State cannot meet this burden on
mere general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they
properly performed their official duties."'' The Court went on to
note: "[T]he prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of challenge for cause... [b]ut the prosecutor may not rebut
the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that
214. Id. at 205.
215. Id. at 212.
216. Id. at 221.
217. Id. at 222.
218. Id. at 224.
219. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
220. Id. at 83.
221. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).




the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that
he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his
intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant because
of their shared race." 4  In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall
stated that "[m]isuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors
has become both common and flagrant,"' and that "[i]n 100 felony
trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors peremptorily struck 405
out of 467 eligible black jurors',1 6 ascribing it in part to an instruction
book used by prosecutors in Dallas County, Texas. 7 The manual"8
exhorted:
"You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased
and sometimes hypocritical individual who believes that Defen-
dants are different from them in kind, rather than degree ....
You are not looking for any member of a minority group which
may subject him to suppression-they almost always empathize
with the accused .... Minority races almost always empathize
with the Defendant .... Jewish veniremen generally make poor
State's jurors. Jews have a history of oppression and generally
empathize with the accused." 9
Allegations continue that some prosecutors violate the spirit of Batson
by striking black jurors on the unarticulated grounds that they will prove
224. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall went on to suggest that the
practice of peremptory challenges be abolished urging, "only by banning peremptories entirely
can such [racial] discrimination be ended." Id. at 108. Wisconsin Senator Lynn Adelman has
submitted S.B. 531, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1995), which if adopted would end
peremptory challenges in both civil and criminal cases.
226. Id. at 104 (Marshall, J., concurring).
227. Id.
228. Jury Selection in Criminal Cases was a chapter in a manual titled Prosecution
Course, prepared by the Dallas County District Attorney's Office "to help train prosecuting
attorneys office in Texas." JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 152 (1977). The manual came to
light when the Texas Observer "obtained and reprinted" parts of it. Id. The Jury Selection
chapter "was written by an assistant district attorney in Dallas named Jon Sparling, who had
become locally famous for persuading a jury to impose a 1,000-year sentence on a convicted
felon ...." Id. Justice Marshall cites to the Van Dyke book when referring to this manual.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 103, 104 n.3.
229. Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty,
1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON CIv. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 1, 14 (1994) (alterations in original). The
author of that article obtained the quoted passage from an Application of Habeas Corpus
Petition, Ex parte Lewis, No. F86-73713-ULH (Dist. Ct. Tex. filed Jan. 5, 1993), to which
petition the manual was attached as an exhibit. Newton, supra, at 14 n.83.
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more sympathetic to black defendants."0
In Powers v. Ohio,"' the Court expanded Batson to rule that a
prosecutor could not use the State's peremptory challenges to exclude
otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by
reason of their race, even if the accused was not of the same race. 3
2
In that case, involving two counts of aggravated murder and one count
of attempted aggravated murder by the white defendant Powers, the
prosecutor used seven of his ten peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the venire. 3
In steps backward, the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez
v. New York3 and in Purkett v. Elem 5 substantially diminished the
impact of Batson. The Court held in Hernandez that "[u]nless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation [for the
strike], the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." 6 The Court
further held in Purkett that the reason provided by the prosecutor as
justification for the complained-of peremptory strike "does not demand
an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." 7  Clearly, under
these later cases, appellate court review of trial court findings that a
prosecutor acted in good faith in striking a black juror cannot be very
aggressive.2' s
230. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
39 (1987); Newton, supra note 229, at 14-15; DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
JUSTICE ON THE CHEAP: THE PHILADELPHIA STORY 10 (1992). Asst. District Attorney
Barbara Christie "had three-times prosecuted accused murderer Charles Diggs. Three times
she used her discretionary peremptory challenges systematically to exclude black jurors. In
the second and third trials, she succeeded in seating all-white juries." Id. (footnote omitted).
231. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
232. Id. at 415.
233. Id. at 402-03.
234. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
235. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
236. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
237. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
238. The National District Attorneys Association opposed Batson and filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of the Kentucky prosecutor on the grounds that the relief sought
contravened historic and contemporary practice in the United States and that if any rule were
adopted that would permit challenging peremptory strikes on the basis of race, it should apply
to the defense counsel as well. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 59, at 206. In
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), the Court applied the rule to defendants. In
that case, the white defendant was stopped from using peremptory challenges to strike black
jurors. Id. at 2359. Paul Butler, an African-American former Special Assistant United States
Attorney and presently an associate professor at the George Washington University Law
School, has proposed that "considering the costs of law enforcement to the black community,
and the failure of white lawmakers to come up with any solutions to black anti-social conduct
other than incarceration, it is, in fact. the moral responsibility of black jurors to emancipate
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The Reverend Jesse Jackson, in an often-quoted remark, told of
walking down the street one night and, upon hearing footsteps behind
him, turned and was relieved to see that the man behind him was
white. 39 Many white night walkers would feel the same way. Now
summon the same white walker into a courtroom as a venireman for a
capital punishment, felony robbery-murder case with the accused being
a black man. Is the presumption of innocence all that it ought to be in
the mind of the walker-now-venireman? The problem of potential
racism, whether conscious or unconscious, in a juror is very real. As the
majority in Turner v. Murray240 noted:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this
case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or
morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in
deciding whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating
factor specified under Virginia law. Such a juror might also be
less favorably inclined toward petitioner's evidence of mental
disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror's
decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred
up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror
to favor the death penalty.
The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing
proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of
the death sentence. "The Court, as well as the separate opinions
of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments
requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the
capital sentencing determination.""24
some guilty black outlaws." Black Jurors: Right to Acquit?, HARPER'S, Dec. 1995, at 11.
Butler would not include homicide in his proposal. Id. at 16. A prosecutor confronted with
a defense attorney and a black defendant intending to subtly advance such a nullification
argument to black jurors would surely be sorely tempted to circumvent Batson if the court
refused to tightly rule on any summons to nullification. A defendant in a highly publicized
case may secure a change in venue and thereby occasion a different racial composition of the
trial jury. Thus the white police officers in the state prosecution of the so-called Rodney King
case were tried by white jurors in Simi Valley rather than by black jurors in Los Angeles.
Rick A Serrano, 2 Views of King Drawn by Lawyers Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at Al.
239. Rev. Jackson made the remark at a meeting of Operation PUSH in Chicago on
Sept. 27, 1993. See Mike Royko, Politically Incorrect, But Right on Target, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
30, 1993, at 3.
240. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
241. Id. at 35 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
[Vol. 79:649
OPPOSING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Turner case involved appeal from the refusal of a state trial judge
to permit voir dire questions of the prospective jurors directed to
whether they would be prejudiced by the fact that the defendant was
black and the slain victim was white.242 The Court found reversible
error in the trial court's decision.243 Who can believe, however, that
the possibility of .racial prejudice influencing a capital punishment
decision can be adequately dealt with through several voir dire questions
to which potential jurors must respond?2' The potential for grave
injustice in a prosecutor's appeal to racial bias during a trial or in a
closing argument to a jury in a capital punishment prosecution of a black
male is manifest.245
If a district attorney takes an oath to treat equally all who come
before him, but then upon seeing in a murder case that the victim is
white or the defendant is black undertakes to violate that oath, is it too
much to ask that he either resign office or bung out his own eyes? Is it
not greater fealty to justice that the oathtaker be blind and abide by the
sworn commitment than that the oath be breached and color play a role
in determining who the government executes? Rather than require a
corps of sightless prosecutors, end capital punishment. Failing that goal,
the racial disparity in capital punishment cases must be addressed, at the
minimum, with a carefully crafted statute such as the Racial Justice Act.
PROSECUTOR ATTITUDES
As the New York State Legislature approached passage of a capital
punishment bill, long-time Manhattan District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau, in a public call for rejection of the proposed legislation,
stated: "Prosecutors must reveal the dirty little secret they too often
share only among themselves: The death penalty actually hinders the
fight against crime."2' Morgenthau noted that resources spent on
242. Id. at 29.
243. Id. at 33.
244. In adopting capital punishment, the State of New York amended its criminal
procedure law by adding a new section, 270.16, which provides an opportunity to either party
in a case involving a crime punishable by death to examine prospective jurors individually and
outside the presence of the other prospective jurors concerning their general qualifications and
particularly regarding the possibility of racial bias. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1 § 14.
245. See Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 158. at
1588-95; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Prosecutor's Appeal in Criminal Case to Racial,
National, or Religious Prejudice as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, or Vacation of
Sentence-Modern Cases, 70 A.L.R. 4th 664 (1995).




capital punishment litigation can bear much better fruit directed at
recidivists and career criminals. 47 He predicted that innocent persons
will be executed.2" He further stated that, "It has long been argued,
with statistical support, that by their brutalizing and dehumanizing effect
on society, executions cause more murders than they prevent.
249
Morgenthau failed to dissuade the legislature and New York adopted a
capital punishment law,250 leaving only Wisconsin and eleven other
states without such a law.5
As the Wisconsin Senate considered a capital punishment bill in
October of 1993, eleven experienced Wisconsin lawyers drawn from both
political parties who were serving or had served as elected state district
attorneys or appointed United States Attorneys wrote a letter to every
state senator urging a vote against the bill on five grounds.5 2 First,
their experience as prosecutors had not persuaded them that capital
punishment deters murder and they pointed out that Wisconsin in 1992,
then one of fourteen states without capital punishment, ranked the
thirty-fifth lowest in the nation in murder and non-negligent homicides
with 4.4 per hundred thousand population as opposed to the national
average of 9.9."53 Second, the letter urged that "[c]onsideration must
be given to the well-documented, disturbingly high number of cases
wherein the defendant received the death sentence but was later
revealed to be innocent of the crime.",1 4  Third, the letter noted,
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. See also Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1041 and n.9 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), which discusses this phenomenon, citing to the Morgenthau article and other
studies.
250. 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1.
251. The other states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1994, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1994].
252. Letter to the Wisconsin State Senators from James B. Brennan, former U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, David J. Cannon, former U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, C. William Foust, Dane County District Attorney, Patricia
J. Gorence, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Gregory E. Grau,
Marathon County District Attorney, Joan F. Kessler, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, Robert J. Lerner, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, E. Michael McCann, Milwaukee County District Attorney, William J. Mulligan,
former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Edmund A. Nix, former U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, and Michael O'Brien, Rock County District
Attorney, Oct. 14, 1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter Wis. Senate Letter].
253. Id. (citing 1992 FBI UNIF. CRIME RPTS. (1992)).
254. Id. (citing to Bedau & Radelet, supra note 33).
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"racism has historically infected the application of capital punishment
laws." 5 The letter continued:
Fourth, the government's use of capital punishment sends the
wrong message. Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States noted that "Our government is the
potent, the omni-present teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example." Sadly, our land is awash with
violence. We must strive ceaselessly to inculcate in our young the
lesson that violence directed toward another is not the answer.
Yet, with capital punishment, our government engages in the
penultimate act of violence, the execution killing of a human
being. The safety of the public and the punishment of the
offender-the raison d'etre of the criminal justice system-can be
instead better served by a defendant's sentence to life imprison-
ment without parole. The danger is thus removed, the violator
punished, and more killing is not legitimized.5 6
Finally, the letter pointed out the very substantial expenditures involved
in sustaining a capital punishment law.57 The State Senate defeated
the 1993 proposal on a vote of twenty-one to twelve. 8
In connection with the filing of capital punishment bills in the 1995-
1996 session of the Wisconsin Legislature 9 and the public interest
stirred by these bills, the State Bar of Wisconsin polled 380 of the district
attorneys and assistant district attorneys in the state as to their attitudes
on the issue.26 Two hundred and forty-seven returned the question-
naire, a 65% response rate. 61
Responses to a series of questions in the poll were as follows: 82%
responded "yes" to the question, "Do you think Wisconsin's 'life means
life' law is a good way to remove dangerous persons from society?, 62
Eighty percent responded "yes" to the question, "Would you prefer
expanding the 'life means life' law by allowing judges to deny the
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id. The author articulated this view in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on Sept. 19, 1989. Death Penalty: Hearings on S. 32, S. 1225, and S. 1696 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 204-16 (1989) (statement of E.
Michael McCann, Milwaukee County District Attorney).
257. Wis. Senate Letter, supra note 252, at 2-3.
258. See supra note 22.
259. See supra.notes 3-6.
260. Criminal Law Section, State Bar of Wisconsin, Death Penalty: Prosecutors Survey





possibility of parole absolutely?"263 Sixty-five percent responded "yes"
to the question, "would you prefer continued or expanded use of the 'life
means life' law as an alternative to enactment of the death penalty in
Wisconsin?"2" Twenty-three percent said "no" to that question and
10% responded "don't know." '65
For many years prior to January 1, 1989, Wisconsin law provided that
for first degree murder, a defendant was to be sentenced to life.2"
Under the parole statute, however, generally a person could qualify for
parole on the life sentence within thirteen years.267 Effective January
1, 1989, modification of the homicide statutes resulted in authority for
the judge in a first degree intentional homicide case as an alternative to
set parole at such date as the judge wished, implicitly including at a date
beyond the normally expected lifetime of the convicted offender.2" A
further modification of the homicide statute, which took effect on August
31, 1995, permits the sentencing judge in a first degree intentional
homicide case to sentence the defendant to imprisonment explicitly for
the rest of his life without parole.26 9 It would appear then that Wiscon-
sin district attorneys, by a majority of at least 65% to 23% favor the
existing intentional homicide sentencing pattern over adoption of a
capital punishment law. 27
0
In responding to the question, "Regardless whether you do or do not
favor reinstatement of the death penalty in Wisconsin, what are the
concerns you would have about the death penalty?",27' the following
percentages expressed concerns about the following problems: 70% were
concerned with "Possible mistaken convictions or executions," 43%
about "Possible racial disparity," 28% about "Ending Wisconsin's
tradition of no death penalty," 38% about "Disproportionate impact on
the poor," 44% about "Arbitrariness," 65% about "Costs," and 80%
about "Lengthy appeals, with delay in closure for victim's families., 272
The 70% of responding prosecuting attorneys articulating concern




266. Wis. STAT. §§ 939.50(3), 940.01(1) & 973.014 (1987-88) (prior to amendments).
267. WIS. STAT. §§ 53.11(1)-(2), & 57.06(1) (1987-88) (prior to amendments).
268. Wis. STAT. § 973.014(1) (1989-90) (prior to 1993 amendment).
269. 1995 Wis. Laws Act 48, § 5.





recognition that even with the commitment to do justice that they bring
to the prosecution of criminal cases, and even with the existing burdens
of proof, they are but human beings capable of fallible error that can
result in death for the innocent. Concerns expressed by the district
attorneys concerning racial disparity, arbitrariness, and disproportionate
impact on the poor simply reflect a recognition that these problems
attend upon capital punishment despite the goodwill the prosecutor
himself or herself may bring to a capital punishment prosecution. The
80% concerned about the impact of lengthy appeals on a victim's family
no doubt are aware that capital punishment appeals extend for in excess
of ten years on average before execution,273 with a substantial percent-
age resulting in reversal.274
The 65% of prosecutors who expressed concern about the costs of a
capital punishment program are no doubt influenced by reports of costs
experienced by other states in adopting capital punishment. The cost of
prosecuting a capital case per execution in North Carolina is $2.16
million.275 Reporter Dave Von Drehle of the Miami Herald studied
capital punishment in Florida and reported that it was costing the state
$3.2 million per execution, that this cost was premised on the most
conservative figures available, and that the cost is growing. 6 In Texas,
a death penalty case on the average costs $2.3 million.277 The New
York Department of Correctional Services has estimated that enactment
of the death penalty,27 will cost the state about $118 million annual-
ly.279 California capital trials are six times more expensive than other
murder trials, and "one report estimated that California could save $90
million each year by [ending] capital punishment., 280  The financial
impact on a county can be even more painful:
273. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1994, supra note 251, at 10. In 1994, the average elapsed
time from sentence to execution was 122 months. Id.
274. Id. at 14. By comparison, the average time between initial appearance and verdict
in contested first degree intentional homicide cases in Milwaukee County is 118 days.
Milwaukee County Homicide Courts Report 10/14/91 - 2/29/96 (on file with author). To date,
only two such verdicts have been overturned on appeal. Id.
275. PHILIP J. Cox & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER
CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 98 (1993).
276. Dave Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, MIAMI
HERALD, July 10, 1988, at 12A.
277. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, MILLIONS MISSPENT: WHAT
POLITICIANS DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
278. New York became a death penalty state in 1995. 1995 N.Y Laws ch. 1.
279. DIETER, supra note 277, at 3 (footnote omitted).
280. Id (footnote omitted).
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In Sierra County, California authorities had to cut police services
in 1988 to pick up the tab of pursuing death penalty prosecutions.
The County's District Attorney, James Reichle, complained, "If
we didn't have to pay $500,000 a pop for Sacramento's murders,
I'd have an investigator and the sheriff would have a couple of
extra deputies and we could do some lasting good for Sierra
County law enforcement. .. ." The county's auditor, Don
Hemphill, said that if death penalty expenses kept piling up, the
county would soon be broke. Just recently, Mr. Hemphill
indicated that another death penalty case would likely require the
county to layoff 10 percent of its police and sheriff force.28" '
Norman Kinne, the Dallas County District Attorney, concerned about
the costs of a capital prosecution stated:
[E]ven though I'm a firm believer in the death penalty, I also
understand what the cost is. If you can be satisfied with putting
a person in the penitentiary for the rest of his life ... I think
maybe we have to be satisfied with that as opposed to spending
$1 million to try and get them executed.... I think we could use
(the money) better for additional penitentiary space, rehabilita-
tion efforts, drug rehabilitation, education, (and) especially devote
a lot of attention to juveniles.2"
Fiscal estimates attached to SB 1, AB 298, and AB 352 warn of the
many millions of dollars adoption of capital punishment in Wisconsin will
cost the state and the millions it will cost counties which bear a portion
of criminal prosecution costs. 283 Wisconsin district attorneys no doubt
understood the fiscal pressures at the state and county levels. Their
salaries and the salaries of their assistants are paid from state funds,'
while all other costs of a district attorney's office must be paid by the
counties.285 It is from this position that district attorneys see and feel
the intense fiscal pressures on state and county budgets, particularly as
those budgets are confronted with diminishing federal support and
increasing citizen resistance to tax increases. In such a climate, it is not
surprising that 65% of the district attorneys express concern about the
costs of capital punishment.8 6 Indeed, in the Wisconsin prosecutors
survey, fully 63% of the prosecutors responded "no," 15% responded
281. Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
282. Id. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
283. See Fiscal Estimates to SB 1, AB 298, and AB 352, Wis. 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96
Reg. Sess. (1995).
284. WIS. STAT. § 978.12 (1993-94).
285. Wis. STAT. § 978.13 (1993-94).
286. Prosecutors Survey, supra note 260.
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"don't know," and only 19% responded "yes" to the question, "do you
believe that a death penalty would be the best use of state and county
criminal justice system funds?" 7
To accurately price out the cost of each execution, one must add
together all those additional costs involved in every prosecution seeking
the death penalty. Every such prosecution would be a bifurcated trial,
with the guilt phase first and the sentencing phase second."s Clearly,
investigation and vigorous preparation by teams of prosecutors and
defense attorneys would be involved. Added costs for trial security,
lengthier detention in the county jail, and many other costs of longer
trials would be carried by the county. The county would also carry the
added costs attendant upon more space for prosecutors, additional
clerical and investigative support needed to prepare for and respond to
motions of the defense, and the fees of a broad range of experts
addressing such issues as the prosecution and defense raise with respect
to the aggravating and mitigating factors.289 In those cases resulting in
life imprisonment with the jury rejecting capital punishment, all the costs
attributable to the fruitless attempt to secure an execution verdict in
excess of what a first degree intentional homicide prosecution presently
costs would be added to the gross figure of overall costs of capital
punishment in the state. A capital punishment conviction is almost
always appealed to the state supreme court and such would be provided
automatically in the currently proposed Wisconsin bills. Substantial costs
often are incurred thereafter within the federal system as relief is
pursued on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court and later
by collateral appeal through state and federal habeas corpus statutes. As
experience in other states suggests that over 40% of capital cases are
overturned on appeal,' retrial pursuing capital punishment can add
measurably to the costs. Emerging from these very expensive prosecu-
tions would be several executions a year. When one divides those
several executions a year into the overall added costs of all the cases that
started out as capital punishment prosecutions, one readily sees why each
execution can cost a state millions of dollars. Hence the accurate
conclusion, that it is far cheaper to sentence those who would otherwise
287. Id.
288. SB 1, supra note 3, § 36; AB 298, supra note 4, § 36; AB 352, supra note 5, § 36,
AB 937, supra note 6, § 35.
289. See Fiscal Estimates to SB 1, AB 298, and AB 352, supra note 283, for detailed
discussions regarding the costs associated with all these aspects of capital cases.
290. William J. Brennan, Foreword: Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (1994).
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be executed to life imprisonment instead. In Milwaukee County over the
past five years since initiation of speedy trial courts, first degree
intentional homicide cases, the very substantial majority of which were
contested jury trials, averaged 118 days from initial appearance to the
return of a jury verdict. 9' To date, only 2 of those 125 contested first-
degree homicide cases have been overturned on appea.1.21 In Milwau-
kee County, the healing process for family members suffering from the
loss of a slain loved one begins, on average, within five months, with no
likelihood of suffering the average ten years of ups and downs, some of
which result in execution and some of which do not, in states with capital
punishment.
In response to the Wisconsin prosecutors survey question, "Regard-
less whether you do or do not favor reinstatement of the death penalty
in Wisconsin, what are the benefits you would anticipate with the death
penalty?," only 33% of prosecutors identified deterrence.293 Apparent-
ly 67%, two-thirds of the prosecutors in this state, do not anticipate that
the adoption of capital punishment would deter murder. Indeed, studies
of numerous deterrence research projects have concluded that one
cannot prove or disprove that capital punishment deters murder.294 In
1994, nine of the ten states with the highest murder and non-negligent
homicide rates had capital punishment laws. 295  Texas, which led the
nation as of December 31, 1994 with the highest number of executions
since 1977 (85),296 the highest number of executions in 1994 (14),§7
and the highest number of death row inmates (394),29' had the tenth
291. Milwaukee County Homicide Courts Report 10/14/91 -2/29/96 (on file with author).
Sentencing usually follows within 30 days.
292. Id.
293. Prosecutors Survey, supra note 215.
294. For a survey of these studies, see Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death
Penalty: Facts v. Faith, in HUGO A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 116-38 (3d
ed. 1982). and sources cited therein. W. Espy in The Death Penalty in America-What the
Record Shows, 11 CHRISTIANITY IN CRISIS 191 (1980), points out that even short term
deterrence is not guaranteed stating that on "May 9, 1879, two black men, Tom Jones and
Henry McLeod, were hanged at Appling, GA. Some white citizens of McDuffie County who
had traveled to Appling to join the festivities got into a brawl immediately after the execution
and 25 shots were fired. One man was fatally wounded and three others injured less
seriously." Id.
295. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 28, at 68-78. The rates per 100,000
inhabitants were: Louisiana-19.8, Mississippi-15.3, Arkansas-12.0, Alabama-11.9,
California-11.8, Illinois and Nevada-11.7, Maryland-11.6, New York (not a death penalty
state in 1994)-11.1, and Texas-11.0. Id. The national average was 9.0. Id. at 60.
296. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1994, supra note 251, at 10.
297. Id. at 1.
298. Id. at 6.
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highest murder and non-negligent homicide rate in the country,299 a
rate almost two and a half times that of Wisconsin."° North Dakota,
the state with the lowest per capita murder and non-negligent homicide
rate in the country30 ' does not have capital punishment.3'2 Five of
the ten states with the lowest rates have no capital punishment.3
Nine of the ten states without capital punishment are among the sixteen
lowest states?' 4 Wisconsin, with a rate of 4.5 per hundred thousand,
half that of the national rate of 9.0, ranked sixteenth lowest in the nation
in 1994.305 Indeed, suggesting the brutalizing effect of capital punish-
ment, as opposed to its supposed deterrent effect, Bowers and Pierce
found that in New York State, over the period from 1907 to 1963, there
occurred, on average, two additional homicides in the month following
an execution.3°6
Forty-nine percent of the prosecutors responding to the Wisconsin
prosecutors survey stated their belief that in actual application the death
penalty is morally wrong, while 23% thought it morally right, 14%
thought it morally neutral, and 13% did not know.3 7 Dane County
District Attorney William Foust no doubt articulated the position of
many prosecutors in stating that he opposed the death penalty "for a
very simple, very fundamental reason; it stems from my belief that
murder is wrong, whether it's committed by the government or someone
299. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1994, supra note 28, at 76.
300. Wisconsin's 1994 rate was 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, just one-half the national
average. Id. at 60, 78.
301. Id. at 74.
302. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1994, supra note 251, at 1.
303. The ten states with the lowest rates per 100,000 were: North Dakota (no death
penalty)-0.2, Vermont (no death penalty)-1.0, New Hampshire (death penalty) and South
Dakota (death penalty)-l.4, Iowa (no death penalty)-1.7, Maine (no death penalty)-2.3,
Utah (death penalty)-2.9, Nebraska (death penalty)-3.1, Minnesota (no death penalty)-3.2,
and Montana (death penalty)-3.3. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1994, supra note 28, at
68-78.
304. The remaining six states with the lowest rates after the lowest ten are: Wyoming
(death penalty)-3.4, Massachusetts (no death penalty)-3.5, Idaho (death penalty)-3.5,
Rhode Island (no death penalty)-4.1, Hawaii (no death penalty)-4.2, and Wisconsin (no
death penalty)-4.5. Id.
305. Id. at 60, 78.
306. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect
of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980). See also John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence
or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 32
CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1994); BOWERS, supra note 158, at 271-335.
307. Prosecutors Survey, supra note 260.
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else. '308 It is clear that approximately half the prosecutors in the state,
knowing that individuals convicted of violating the first degree intention-
al homicide statute and sentenced to life without parole will never be
released, have grave moral reservations concerning the alternative of
becoming personally involved in killing those offenders.
OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN WISCONSIN
As the Wisconsin legislature approached a vote on capital punish-
ment in October of 1993, Jack Murtaugh, executive director of the
Interfaith Conference of Greater Milwaukee, announced that "[s]ome of
the faith groups will be very active" in opposing the capital punishment
bill.3"9 Opposition at that time, which continues, includes Baptist,
Catholic, Episcopalian, Jewish, Lutheran, Presbyterian, United Method-
ist, and state and local interfaith conferences.310 A statement from the
Milwaukee Jewish Council at that time noted, "We believe that capital
punishment is no greater a deterrent to crime than other forms. of
punishment and that it is unequally applied against the poor and against
minority groups...31 The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Wisconsin
stated that "the death penalty is not fair by gender, race, age or
economic status. Rich people don't get put to death. 3 12
A statement issued in October of 1993 by the Interfaith Committee
on Social and Economic Justice in Madison, in reiteration of a 1980
General conference of the United Methodist Church stated:
In spite of a common assumption to the contrary, "an eye for
an eye and a tooth for a tooth," does not give justification for the
imposing of the penalty of death. Jesus explicitly repudiated the
lex talionis (Matthew 5:38-39) and the Talmud denies its literal
meaning, replacing it with financial indemnities. 313
By the 1970s and 1980s, numerous religious communities had
articulated opposition on religious and other grounds against capital
punishment.314 These positions have evolved in some denominations
308. Theo. Kramer, "Approaching Spiritual Death". Political, Religious Leaders Oppose
Capital Punishment, MADISON TIMES, Sept. 8-14, 1995, at 1.
309. Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Religious Organization Will Battle Death Penalty,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1993, at 5A.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 10A.
313. Statement of the United Methodist Church in NAT'L COALITION TO ABOLISH THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY CALLS FOR ABOLITION 48 (1988).
314. See id., passim, in which the following organizations' official positions on the death
penalty were published: American Baptist Churches in the USA, American Ethical Union,
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from earlier positions which emphasized the licitness or authority of the
state to execute while the more recent statements emphasize the
approach of charity set forth in Chapter 5 of the Biblical book of
Matthew. Saint Augustine, in his De Civitate Dei (The City of God),
emphasized the authority of the state to take life.31 5 Students at Jesuit
universities in the 1950s were exposed to the thinking of scholastic
philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, who had considered questions on capital
punishment in his Summa Theologica. A moral ethics textbook in use
in the 1950s, citing Aquinas, stated:
A state ... may kill a criminal who has seriously offended
against the common good of the community. Just as it is
reasonable to cut off a diseased member of the human body,
when this member threatens the welfare of the whole body, so it
is reasonable to permit the body politic to cut off a bad member
of society for the sake of the good of the whole society.
Capital punishment may also be justified on the reasoning that
a serious criminal has receded so far from the order of reason
that he is no longer worthy of treatment as a rational being.316
Reflecting the metamorphosis in approach, without denying the state's
authority to take life, the United States Catholic Conference of Bishops
in a 1980 Statement on Capital Punishment, reiterating that man is made
in the image of and likeness of God, called for the abolition of capital
punishment based on numerous considerations, among them the beliefs
that: (1) "infliction of the death penalty extinguishes possibilities for
reform and rehabilitation for the person executed...;,317 (2) "abolition
sends a message that we can break the cycle of violence ... ;,,3s (3)
"imposition of capital punishment involves the possibility of mis-
take;, 319 (4) "racist attitudes and the social consequences of racism
have some influence in determining who is sentenced to die in our
General Association of General Baptists, General Conference Mennonite Church, Lutheran
Church in America, Mennonite Central Committee U.S., The Mennonite Church, The
Moravian Church, National Board YWCA of the USA, National Council of the Churches of
Christ in the USA, The Orthodox Church in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), Reformed
Church in America, Unitarian Universalist Association, United Church of Christ, United
Methodist Church, and United States Catholic Conference.
315. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD Book I, ch. 21, at 53 (Demetrius B. Zema &
Gerald G. Walsh, trans., 1950) (1413).
316. VERNON J. BOURKE, ETHICS 354-55 (1951) (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, Part II - II, Question 64, Art. 3).
317. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONF., U.S. BISHOPS' STATEMENT ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 9 (1980).
318. Id. at 7.
319. Id. at 9.
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society [which the Bishops] do not regard as acceptable;"32 (5) society
must contemplate the suffering and destruction of lives brought by
violent crime, but the answer is not vengeance. A special responsibility
lies with the church to "provide a community of faith and trust in which
God's grace can heal the personal and spiritual wounds caused by crime
and in which we can all grow by sharing one another's burdens and
sorrows; '321 and (6) "that abolition of the death penalty is most conso-
nant with the example of Jesus, who both taught and practiced the
forgiveness of injustice .... "322
In 1993, in anticipation of the State Senate vote on capital punish-
ment, both the Wisconsin Catholic Conference and the Catholic
Archbishop of Milwaukee issued statements in opposition to capital
punishment. 3 The catechism of the Catholic Church, an official
document published in 1994, noted that "the traditional teaching of the
Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of
legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of penalties
commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of
extreme gravity, the death penalty., 324 The catechism went on to state,
however, that "[i]f bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives
against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of
persons, public authority should limit itself to such means, because they
better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and
are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person. ' 32 In his
encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II provided:
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature
and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and
decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words,
when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today
however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization
of the p a stem, such cases are very rare, if not practically
320. Id. at 10.
321. Id. at 11.
322. Id. at 8.
323. John A. Huebscher, Executive Director, Wis. Catholic Conf., There Are Better
Ways to Help Children than Restoring Death Penalty, Oct. 7, 1993 (statement on file with
author); Archbishop Rembert G. Weakland, State Mustn't Live by the Sword, MILWAUKEE
SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1993, at A19.
324. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, Art. 5, 2266 (1994).
325. Id. 2267.
326. POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EVANGELIUM VITAE] 56 (1995).
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In August of 1995, a coalition of individuals and groups opposing
capital punishment formally incorporated into the Wisconsin Coalition
Against Capital Punishment. The chair of the group is Carolyn Smith,
the District Attorney of Iowa County. Others on the board are
reflective of the opposition to the death penalty of many of the groups
with which they are affiliated.327 As is apparent, the opposition to
capital punishment, premised on moral grounds, continues from the'
churches.
CONCLUSION
Wisconsin employed capital punishment from 1848 to 1853.32
Apparently, only John McCaffary, who had slain his wife, was subjected
to this extreme penalty.32 He was publicly hanged in Kenosha before
some three thousand people.3" Another defendant, William Radcliffe,
was tried in Milwaukee in 1852 for murder in a circumstantial evidence
case and was found not guilty reportedly in part because of jurors'
reluctance to return a verdict of guilt on the murder charge knowing that
the punishment had to be execution.33' In two trials in Waukesha
County in the early 1850s, juries did not convict of willful murder
reportedly because of antipathy to capital punishment.332 Sentiment
rose against capital punishment and with the construction of Wisconsin's
first state prison (Waupun) nearing completion, life imprisonment posed
a preferable alternative to capital punishment.333 In July of 1853, the
capital punishment law was repealed.3"
327. Other members include Bruce Colburn of the Milwaukee County Labor Council
AFLCIO, Jon Nelson of the Wisconsin Association for Retarded Citizens, Kathleen Krenek
of the Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Felmers Chaney of the Milwaukee
NAACP, Jackie Austin of Wisconsin CURE, Anne Luber of the Benedict Center, Michael
Blumenfield of the Milwaukee Jewish Council, Sister Mary Christine Fellerhoff of the
Leadership Conference of Women Religious, Jerry Folk of the Wisconsin Conference of
Churches, John Huebscher of the Wisconsin Catholic Conference, Rev. Sue Larson of the
Lutheran Office for Public Policy, Marcus White of the Interfaith Conference of Greater
Milwaukee, and Marjorie Morgan of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. Also on the board are
Rev. Tim Kuehl of Madison, Rev. Roy Nabors of Milwaukee, Milwaukee County Supervisor
Dorothy Dean, Mary Bottari of Madison, and Attorney Dean Strang of Milwaukee.
328. Alexander T. Pendleton & Blaine R. Renfert, A Brief History of Wisconsin's Death
Penalty, 66 Wis. LAW 26, 29 (Aug. 1993).
329. Id. at 28-29.
330. Id. at 29.
331. Id. at 28.





Extensive experience with capital punishment in this country teaches
that innocent persons have been and will be erroneously executed,33
that racism plays and will continue to play a role in who is executed,336
and that capital punishment is more expensive per execution than life
imprisonment.337 Extensive research provides no convincing evidence
that capital punishment deters murders, 338 and limited research suggests
executions may occasion later homicides. 39  Sixty-five percent of the
prosecutors in the state favor the imposition of life without parole over
capital punishment with forty-nine percent citing moral reasons among
the grounds for their opposition to executions.340 Many religious
bodies in Wisconsin oppose capital punishment."4' Justice is well
served in Wisconsin with the present life without parole punishment for
intentional homicide.
In Callins v. Collins,342 Justice Blackmun, after supporting the
theory of capital punishment throughout his long judicial career, held
that "despite the effort of the States and courts to devise legal formulas
and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty
remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mis-
take." 3  He went on to note that "the inevitability of factual, legal,
and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some
defendants."3" His conclusion: "From this day forward, I no longer
shall tinker with the machinery of death."345 The legislature and the
people of Wisconsin would be well served by not engaging the hellish
machinery of capital punishment.
335. See supra notes 29-59 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 111-245 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 275-292 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 293-306 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 309-326 and accompanying text.
342. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun. J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
343. Id. at 1129.
344. Id. at 1130.
345. Id.
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